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                                                33 For example, in Ideas I Husserl takes for granted the notion that phenomenology deals with “acts” of consciousness, whose “meaning‐intentions” are either “empty” or “fulfilled.” This principle is of course foundational to Husserl’s ideas on perception. For example, while I can see or “intend” one side of a die, I generally also “intend” its hidden sides as well. The former intention is fulfilled by intuitive evidence—the givenness of the die in its color, shape, etc., as it shows itself to me visually. The latter “signitive” intentions are not fulfilled and are thus “empty”—unless or until other sides of the die are seen by me. The distinction is important for it allows Husserl to explain how it is that we perceive the die and not merely “this side of” the die. We perceive objects, in other words, not merely profiles. This is one of Husserl’s strategies, so to say, for overcoming the “appearance‐reality” divide that has hampered previous theories of perception. 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hope to do full justice to the many angles one might use to approach and address Husserl’s multifaceted answer to these questions. To take one example, we will have to gloss over the significant controversies surrounding Husserl’s concept of the “noema”34 or of its relation to “fulfilment.”35 Nonetheless, many of the sorts of fundamental problems that arise in such debates will be touched on in other sections of the overview provided below. This overview, along with some independent commentary and brief references to some of the secondary literature on Ideas I, will constitute the bulk of this chapter.      Yet given the relatively “intermediary” status of Ideas I in the course of Husserl’s own lifelong task (from Ideas I onward) of explaining transcendental phenomenology, it might still be wondered why we are concentrating in this chapter on this particular text. Merleau‐Ponty, for example, regarded Ideas I as a belonging to a “middle” or “transition” period between Husserl’s “logicism,” presumably culminating in the Logical Investigations, and the later supposed “existentialism” of 
                                                34 This question has been written about endlessly, especially in context of the debate between those who interpret the noema as “percept” (Gurwitsch, Cairns, et al.) and those, lead chiefly by Føllesdal, who interpret it as a variant of Frege’s Sinn. For a nice recap of the debate, see: Solomon, Robert C. “Husserl’s Concept of the Noema.” In Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, Frederick A. Elliston and Peter McCormack, eds. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977 (pp. 54‐69). Solomon begins his essay by noting: “It is generally agreed that the concept of the noema is one of the themes, if not the central theme, of Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy.” J. N. Mohanty is seemingly in perfect agreement when he makes a passing reference to “the all‐important idea of noema and noetic‐noematic structure, regarded by many as constituting the most important and original part of [Ideas I].” (Mohanty, J. N. The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl: A Historical Development. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008, p. 372) Another topic we will have to leave out, though in this case because it is almost wholly absent from the Ideas itself, is the topic of time‐constitution, which later figures deeply in all of Husserl’s most advanced analyses. 35 For an excellent summary of the debate, see Pol Vandevelde’s introduction to Key (pp. 16‐20). Also of note is Ricoeur’s remark, inspired also by the difficulties surrounding the noema, and quoted by Vandevelde in the introduction, that ‘thus, reality always seems to escape transcendental constitution.” 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the “life‐world” philosophy, best known through the Crisis.36 Given such views, why not review Husserl’s later reformulations of much of this material? Moreover, as mentioned above, Husserl himself later admits to the disadvantages—though not necessarily inadequacies—of the “Cartesian” way to the reduction presented herein. He also developed a new form of phenomenology, “genetic” or “dynamic” phenomenology, which supplements (and some say supplants) the “static” phenomenology of Ideas I.  The fact remains, however, that Husserl himself never totally abandoned either the static or the “Cartesian” phenomenological method. Regarding the latter, for example, no less than the author of the heterodox text The Other Husserl, Donn Welton notes that “[t]he existence of the Cartesian Meditations, and the fact that [Husserl] recommended its French translation to readers as late as 1933 even as he began developing the text of the Crisis…convinces us that [the Cartesian way to the reduction] was never overthrown.”37 Furthermore, Husserl never abandoned the basic framework of “transcendental subjectivity” and its wholly non‐naturalistic essence. Ideas I presents a broadly faithful picture of the basic thrust of transcendental phenomenology, and this fact, combined with its historical importance and the fact that it is the “prequel” to Ideas II, a text equally if not more vital for our task, are, I believe, enough to recommend it for detailed investigation at the present time. 






                                                38 This language will be explained below (IVA). Note that the term “reduction” does not have the modern meaning of “reductiveness” for Husserl; there is no question here of converting objective reality into a subjective substratum. “Reduce” means, etymologically, “to bring or lead back,” and this is Husserl’s intended meaning. The reduction leads back a consciousness that loses itself in its world—back to its own achievements as a sense‐bestowing and world‐constituting being. 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cannot be denied that Husserl did in some sense prioritize subjectivity over objective “reality.” Husserl did not deny the existence of such a reality, but as we will see, under the reduction it acquires a wholly new sense—namely, that of being the sense “mind‐independent reality” (along with innumerable other senses which give the world its “intelligibility”). To put it another (un‐Husserlian) way, while we can say that there is a world that transcends the mind, it only does so for the mind,39 acquiring its meaningfulness as such a transcendent being in this way alone. Thus, it can in a certain way be called independent (in its existence, or “thatness”) from the mind in one way and yet wholly dependent on it (for its meaning, or “whatness”) in another. Consciousness itself—in its “purified” and “transcendental” form—is, by contrast, dependent on nothing. And it is solely because of this asymmetry, and not because of some supposed “non‐existence” of external reality, that Husserl calls consciousness (as opposed to the transcendent world as such) “absolute.” All of these notions will be further explored individually, however, in Part IV below. In the sections that follow, I will proceed to describe the reduction as it is outlined in Ideas I. Along the way, I will be flagging some of the most significant and controversial issues of interpretation, as well as possible inconsistencies, mysteries, or ambiguities in Husserl’s account, which can be (and usually already have been) raised. In doing so, it is inevitable that some commentary be mixed with “pure” description (contrary to the spirit of Husserl’s own methodology!) even before the 




                                                40Of course, what is possibly most controversial about the reduction is how it can be “begun” at all, but we will come to that later (Part V). 41 This picture of “attitudes” will become importantly expanded and enriched in Ideas II, in which the natural attitude is divided into “personalistic” and “naturalistic” forms. These will be discussed closely in the next chapter. 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subjectivity—in ourselves: “I must lose the world by epoché, in order to regain it by a universal self‐examination.”42  But what does Husserl mean by attitude (Einstellung)? Amazingly, Husserl nowhere defines his technical usage of the term in the text of the Ideas (or anywhere, as far as I can tell), perhaps owing to its status as basic to understanding the reduction itself. For now, we will see how Husserl uses the term; we will return to the question of how it might best be defined at the end of this section.  To describe the natural attitude, Husserl presents a series of observations of what experience in this attitude consists in:   “I am conscious of a world endlessly spread out in space, endlessly becoming and having endlessly become in time. I am conscious of it: that signifies, above all, that intuitively I find it immediately, that I experience it. By my seeing, touching, hearing, and so forth, and in the different modes of sensuous perception, corporeal physical things…are simply there for me, “on hand” in the literal and figurative sense…”43  In the natural attitude, he continues, “we… [are] human beings who are living naturally, objectivating, judging, feeling, willing.”44 But animate beings and people are there for me also: “I look up; I see them… I grasp their hands…”45  The natural attitude is “natural” first of all in the sense of its everyday pervasiveness as well as its default character. It comes to us “naturally.” Roughly, then, we can characterize this as a condition in which we as normal, adult human beings find ourselves routinely and as it were automatically, just insofar as we are 
























                                                54 Ideas I, xix 55 Ibid., xix 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consciousness as its ultimate horizon). What he is interested in is the “attempt” at doubt. For while we cannot doubt certain things, “we can attempt to doubt anything whatever, no matter how firmly convinced of it, even assured of it in an adequate evidence, we may be.”56 The nature of such an act, the attempt at doubt, is to hypothetically place the existence of that which is doubted into metaphorical “brackets” or “parentheses.” It “effects a certain annulment of positing and precisely this interests us.” There is no question of negating that which exists, i.e. denying its existence. But there is a sudden neutrality with regard to this entire question—something “wholly peculiar.”57 The question of the existence of things is suddenly “put out of action,” and in my words, into a kind of purgatorial “maybe” that nevertheless allows one to focus on something else—in this case, on the manners of givenness of things. This new focus58 automatically implicates them as experienced by someone, i.e., shows them in their “self‐givenness.”  As we have said, the “parenthesizing” of “positings” of existence is what is called the “epoché.” More specifically, there are several types of epoché. What is at issue now, however, is not, for example, the kind of epoché one speaks of in regards to the “bracketing” of features unrelated to the study at hand (for example, a scientist brackets all value‐predicates of “physical” objects and focuses on their spatiotemporal determinations solely, a phenomenological psychologist brackets all material or biochemical aspects of an living organism, etc.), but rather the full and 
































































                                                84 See, for example: Husserl, Edmund. “Kant and the idea of transcendental phenomenology,” trans. Ted E. Klein, Jr. and William E. Pohl. The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 5.3 (1974), p. 11 (citation found in Russell, p. 91) 85 Ibid., p. 106 (my italics) 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Fundamental to this picture is the notion of givenness. In the words of one commentator, “the given...includes not only that which is immanent in a real sense but also the transcendent, provided that it is given.”86 This also allows Husserl to convert all transcendence into what he calls “immanent transcendency.” With respect to physical things this term denotes that “...the transcendency belonging to the physical thing as determined by physics is the transcendency belonging to a being which becomes constituted in, and tied to, consciousness...”87 Yet in this case, one might suspect that Husserl has secured access to the “things” at a bit of an unfair price. Such a criticism might run as follows: Either things are not truly transcendent, or they are not necessarily known—unlike their phenomenal appearance, which may, after all, with Kant, be conditioned by our own cognitive apparatus. But Husserl despises both subjectivism and constructivism as equally unbearable concessions to the skeptic (or the strict Kantian), so these options are closed by him. Husserl wants a pure transparency of being—a pure knowing—as well as the otherness, so to speak, of this being, or the object. But can he have this? Husserl would probably argue that the counter‐argument sketched above rests on a false dilemma that transcendental phenomenology moves beyond. The critic does not see a third possibility between transcendental realism and skepticism, namely the possibility of a transcendental level at which the world is revealed to be integrally unified with consciousness. This is but a brief pre‐sketch of 





















                                                96 Ibid., p. 93 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could we know it in the first place, or perceive the world—“it itself”—in acts of perception, if this were the case? This sort of comparison to Descartes would be especially irresponsible given Husserl’s trenchant critique of that philosopher’s view, already partially laid out above (IIB). Whatever Husserl’s position with respect to his argument for transcendental phenomenology, it should be clear by now that he has rejected naïve realism, Kantian dualism, representationalism, and Cartesian dualism alike. Indeed, it is better to start on his own terms—that is, in terms of “transcendental idealism.” Consciousness is transcendental in that it makes both experience—“natural” experience—and the world so experienced, possible. Transcendentality is not, however, a sufficient condition for the existence of transcendent objects. Husserl does not deny the reality of nature—of a realm of purely transcendent being (albeit defined under conditions in which such transcendence obtains in necessarily co‐subjective terms). None of this is to deny, however, that Husserl can sound like a dualist much of the time. With the transcendental reduction, Husserl frees transcendental consciousness from the “real world.” Thus he speaks of the “essential detachableness of the whole natural world from the domain of consciousness”97 and proclaims that a “veritable abyss yawns between consciousness and reality.”98 His words here admittedly concern not “natural” consciousness—or the human or animal psyche—but “pure” consciousness. Yet  even so, they raise concerns about the possibility that Husserl has descended into a Cartesian‐style dualism. Husserl 








                                                102 However accurate or misguided this position may be, it is powerful enough to exert considerable pressure over a later, “post‐transcendental” phenomenologist like Merleau‐Ponty. For his part, Merleau‐Ponty was equally opposed to scientific naturalism, but not on the grounds that it was correct in its own domain, yet overly presumptuous in taking the “natural” world as the domain of all being. Husserl widens the net, preserving science wholesale in its most basic objectivist assumptions, while Merleau‐Ponty attacks transcendentalism (in both its Kantian and Husserlian forms) and scientific naturalism alike, in search for a holistic alternative, one might say. Yet all the same, Merleau‐Ponty would have to struggle with the problem of distinguishing philosophy’s task compellingly from those of the sciences; he was to settle finally on a notion of reciprocity, contrary to Husserl’s uncompromising, but to some, more appealing absolutism. 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For with any given case of (possible) perception, “the possibility of the non‐being of the world is never excluded.”103 Or again:   “What hovers before one may be a mere figment; the hovering itself, the inventive consciousness, is not itself invented and there belongs to its essence, as to any other mental process, the possibility of a perceiving reflection which seizes upon absolute factual being.”104  Besides, the existence of external objects is established only on the basis of coherent patterns of experience over extended periods of time—but what if these were to dissolve into full‐blown incoherence, i.e. “chaos”? “The world” would not now “exist”, but consciousness (of a real or imagined world) nonetheless would.    This latter notion—featured in Husserl’s “world‐annihilation” experiment—is perhaps the most radical thought in all of the Ideas I, as well as perhaps its most contested, even by many Husserlians. The thought experiment is designed to show the ultimate asymmetry of consciousness and world—and subsequently to lend further proof of the independence of transcendental phenomenology from the empirical sciences of the “natural attitude.” Husserl observes that the meaning “world” is established as a certain harmony of appearances. That is, physical things can by definition never become completely immanent, and hence we cannot know them absolutely and directly. So the only way we come to understand them to exist transcendently is through the regular ways in which they appear to us. It is on the basis of appearances or presentations of things to consciousness that we posit (as it were) the existence of a transcendent world—only then does its “meaning” as 






                                                105 Ibid., pp. 342‐3 106 If others reported seeing it as well, this would begin to change our view. But then again, they would not report it, either, unless there were some reason—a harmony of appearance and satisfied expectations over time—to do so. 107 Ideas I, p. 109 108 Ibid., p. 109 109 Ibid., p. 65 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or perception (“esse est percipi”). His point is that we would have no reason to posit the existence of transcendent things in the first place, were it not for the deliverances of consciousness in the form of adumbrated appearance‐perceptions. Yet in its reflexive moment of self‐perception, the same cannot be said of consciousness itself: it can be sure of its existence, an existence that is therefore, in this sense, “absolute.” And it can see self‐evidently that it exists, even if there is no maturely formed “ego” there to be able to articulate this. This much of the Cartesian legacy survives in Ideas I.110 For Husserl, consciousness’ knowledge of itself, at some deep level, is absolute. This is enough to ground transcendental phenomenology—namely on a “pure” level of experience in which all objects, on the noematic side, as well as all perceivings and thinkings, on the noetic, are constituted.  To deny that this sort of asymmetry exists might be tempting, but on what grounds could we do so after the epoché? Certainly there are no grounds to speak of a causally necessary relationship of world to consciousness, for it is precisely any possible causal relation between the two that Husserl purposefully brackets and 

















                                                117 He explicitly rejects the label in Ideas I, 129 118 Crisis 159‐60 119 Ideas I, p. 112 120 Cf.: “From the transcendental standpoint one understands the natural attitude as a ‘lower’ stance, or which says the same, the natural attitude is already transcendental, yet without knowing it. The 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(because it is freer of “presuppositions”), it follows that we should obey its authority when it reveals that the essence of worldly being is to be dependent on another, in a way that does not apply symmetrically to consciousness itself. We are still not talking about existential‐causal dependence, however. We are not claiming that the world is a fiction generated by the imagination, or that it is merely a variant of consciousness itself. After all, because consciousness is inherently intentional, it is always already a consciousness “of” things, of its “surrounding world”—which Husserl also makes clear is a constant ground in a way that imagined and remembered worlds are not. So the world cannot be dismissed or subjectivized; but it can be revealed as a being dependent for its meaning on another, and this is consciousness.  Yet can we not turn this argument back, and argue that consciousness is similarly dependent for its meaning—as consciousness—on the world? Not for Husserl, crucially. The reason is remarkably simple: a certain sort of primordial subjectivity remains, as a residue, after all other things—all existential claims—have been bracketed. Acts of consciousness remain, and they remain intuitively accessible as just what they are, without the interference of any “presuppositions.” The existence of consciousness is not something we claim; it—the “transcendental ego”—is the basis for the making of any valid claims whatsoever. It is the ultimate, timeless, and primordial source of meaning. Husserl does not claim for it the status 
                                                natural attitude is ‘implicate’ in the transcendental perspective.” (Luft, 225) Only, we might wish to make a distinction between raw natural experience and such experience as laden with realistic “assumptions,” the latter being the full “natural attitude” as Husserl describes it. 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of a godhead, however. Strictly, it is neither “human” nor “divine.” (!) Yet it certainly is self‐contained:    “[C]onsciousness considered in its purity must be held to be a self‐contained complex of being, a complex of absolute being into which nothing can penetrate and out of which nothing can slip, to which nothing is spatiotemporally external and which cannot be affected by any physical thing...”121   Now ironically, this sort of remark has precisely the effect of circumventing the possibility of dualism. For what Husserl is telling us is that (pure) consciousness is not something on the same level as either “physical” things or “mental” ones (non‐”purified” subjective things like particular human egos and their “real” components), and that it is not indeed a thing at all, but the basis on which all things become known and defined. Whether we agree with him or not, we must take seriously his own claim to be revealing an undiscovered country, as it were, whose terrain has never before been seen. It is as if to say that Husserl claims to have found (or rediscovered, after Descartes and others) the access point, itself neither part of the world nor other than it, to the comprehensibility of that world (and itself). This structure is the ultimate concern of “philosophy,” now understood as “transcendental phenomenology”—the study of the underlying structures, or again the origins of,122 experience and experienceable reality.   We might end this section with an extended quote from Husserl, in which he himself neatly summarizes the bulk of his position in Ideas I. Hopefully, by now the reader will be familiar with the concepts discussed herein: 











                                                124 Ibid., p. 39 125 Ibid.; Husserl’s italics 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has memorably put it, “mind and world.”126 Husserl shows us that in fact, the two are intertwined at all levels, even though eidetically distinct. But how is this possible? How can there be a world that gives itself to us even while this givenness is subject to strict rules governed by the life of an essentially un‐worldly Ego? How is this not to be thought of as anything more than an arbitrary positing of a quasi‐Leibnizian “pre‐established harmony”? What is the essential, inner law that would make the fusion of the real and the ideal an actuality, and not a blind hope?  It would seem that Husserl’s “transcendental ego” does not so much offer a solution as it literally gives a name to just this hope—it is a promise, an earnest, rather than a solution. It does not improve on Hegel’s “Absolute Spirit” and in fact lacks the latter’s univocal (in this case, ideal) nature. Husserl’s theory asks for a separation of essence from fact, real from ideal, transcendental from natural—all the while insisting that no such cleavages compromise his vision of pure and direct cognition of the “things themselves.” This is a tough sell. For is there not an unavoidable tension between any form of transcendental idealism and the notion of “transcendent things”? So long as these are merely “immanent transcendencies,” does not Husserl’s position veer precipitously towards subjective or absolute idealism, albeit clearly against his own intentions? It is in fact the latter hidden possibility—the possibility of an “absolute” idealism—that hovers constantly over his work in the idealist phase. Yet there are even deeper reasons—reasons that the structure of Husserl’s own system provides us with—to believe that Husserl’s “transcendental idealism” is intrinsically oriented towards absolute idealism, by 









                                                127 This was already pointed out astutely by Ricoeur. See Key, p 42 & pp. 48‐9 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at the heart of Husserl’s system.128 It is my considered view, then, that Husserl must be an absolute or unmitigated idealist—one who denies any co‐ultimacy of “natural” reality with transcendental consciousness/subjectivity—on pain of the potential for his system to dissolve into incoherence and permanent vacillation between transcendence and transcendentality.                    
































                                                137 Husserl 1919, 186 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the nature of “spirit” vis‐à‐vis that of “consciousness” or “transcendental subjectivity,” the latter of which of course figures so ubiquitously in the scheme of Husserl’s project as a whole. This particular issue goes to the heart of the ambiguity between Husserl’s distinction between ontology and phenomenology, the real and the transcendental, and, in addition to the prior ambiguities about nature and the body, make it possible to see where Husserl’s transcendental‐phenomenological project starts to unravel somewhat from within. Or more charitably speaking, these problems seem to call for a transformation of Husserlian phenomenological project in a more unified direction, one of which happens to involve a more immanentized and embodied conception of the ego (which ought not be entirely aloof from ontology) and a more ecstatic, “enworlded” conception of the body (which ought not to be entirely aloof from the ego). This is the direction ultimately taken by Merleau‐Ponty, for whom the transcendental ego must situate itself somehow (and never wholly comfortably) in nature itself, namely as a power of finite reflection, capable of a certain “eidetic seeing” but incapable of absolute transparency or a final victory over its all‐too‐natural Grund. Thus, Merleau‐Ponty’s entire original project, one might say, is first made possible by the volatile ruptures of Ideas II.138 But we will have to wait before we examine this “second half” of the story in more detail, in Chapter 3 (and briefly, in the conclusion of the present chapter).   In part II of this chapter I will provide a detailed outline of the general ontological matrix sketched out by Husserl in Ideas II (and continued in III), 






































                                                conditioned by the vagaries of the epoch. Instead, he presents it as a “timeless” attitude, which even the ancients, for example, may have performed, but simply did not have the right information to do.  161 Perhaps in the Sartrean sense of absurdly being “there,” de trop? This would help explain Sartre’s own dualistic appropriation (“in itself” and “for itself”) of Husserlian (by way of Hegelian) phenomenology.  162 See fn 106, below, and also fn 107. 163 Ideas II, 97‐99 164 I am following the useful convention of the English translators of Ideas II of signifying Leib with “Body” and other references to the body with the lower‐case “body.” (Ideas II, XIV‐XV) 165 Ibid., 297 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b) The body as body‐thing, or slab of matter in space and time, subject to forces of natural causality. (“body” when the context is clear, otherwise “Körper” or “body‐thing”) c) The body as a “thing” “inserted” between the rest of the material world and the “subjective” sphere;166 also “own body” d) The body as Leib, the living animate organism, or animal, which possesses a psychical or soulish stratum, appresented with its material substantiality.  e) The soul or psyche itself, which forms the upper stratum of the Leib, the lower stratum of which is material Nature.   Of course the picture is still more nuanced. For example, there is at the level of the Body the level of sensations, including kinaesthetic sensations, which is the “aesthesiological body,” while at a higher level there is the “volitional body,” which is responsible for “acting” in the sense of “willing” and acting on the “I can.”167 Husserl’s treatment of the body‐soul relation is very interesting. The soul and the Body are intertwined. Thus in this respect, Husserl sides with Aristotle, so to speak, rather than Plato: “the soul is indeed ever one with the Body.”168 There can indeed never be a separation of soul and Body, a point Husserl makes dramatically through a detailed discussion of the a priori eidetic necessity for even a ghost to have a Body. Without a body of any sort, no ghost, here by definition a “phantom” in Husserl’s unique sense, could be perceived or apperceived (or for that matter hallucinated); appresentation of the psyche always occurs through perception of certain kinds of bodies.169 This sort of discussion in fact raises the interesting counter‐image to that of the mind as a “ghost in the machine.” For in the case of 
                                                166 Ibid., 169 167 Husserl speaks of the “I can” as a practical to‐be‐able‐to that is prior to doing (e.g., Ibid., 273), an “original consciousness of abilities” that helps us to constitute the world with which I may interact. “What I can do, what is in my power, what I know myself capable of and am conscious of as such, that is what a practical possibility is.” (Ibid., 270) It is only this that “can be a theme of my will.” 168 Ibid., 176 169 Ibid., 100‐2 
 87 
Husserl, the image couldn’t work: for the ghost, being already embodied, could not be said to need yet another body (“machine”) to be “in.” In this way it becomes obvious that Husserl’s conception of the “leibisch­seelisch” being, the psychophysical organism, cannot be identified with, say, Plato’s or Descartes’ explicit remarks on the separability of mental and physical substances, if we mean by this what Husserl calls “soul” and “Body.”170  But does Husserl actually go too far in the direction of anti‐dualism of Body and soul? There is a sense, for example, in which Husserl’s view is epiphenomenalistic.171 Remarking for example that “the thing and the whole of nature are sealed off,” he goes on to argue: “Psychical consequences are joined to natural processes, just as psychical causes have consequences in nature, but they are such that in truth they have no influence on nature.”172 Husserl seems to seal the deal as he describes the nature of causality itself: “It is clear that causality of physical nature has in fact a pre‐eminent sense. This causality is a constitutive idea for the idea of nature, for the idea of a physical thing… For reasons of principle, the psychic is outside this nexus.”173 

























                                                189 Ricoeur, 52 (my emphasis) 190 Ideas II, 109 191 Ibid., 110 192 Ibid., 111 193 Cobb‐Stevens defines the person as the “full concrete unity of soul and body.” (Cobb‐Stevens, 250) To say this of the transcendental ego would be to mundanize it in a way unacceptable to Husserl. On the distinction of person and transcendental ego, Cobb‐Stevens writes: “the person is too involved in the Umwelt by reason of pragmatic motivations to be completely identified with the philosophical voice that describes the stratum of spirit.” (Cobb‐Stevens, 253) 194 See for example, Ideas II, 109. 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up in part III the question of the relation of the transcendental ego (consciousness) with our next concept‐theme, “spirit.”  4. Spirit Suddenly in Ideas II Husserl (or, if we like, the “narrator”) signals a radical shift in perspective that will usher in the third section of already exhaustingly demanding work: “the analysis of [material and animal] nature in our consideration of nature thus proves to be in need of supplementation. It harbors presuppositions and consequently points beyond to another realm of being and of research, i.e., the field of subjectivity, which no longer is nature.”195 Thus, we enter into the realm of spirit, home of the human sciences, culture, personhood, and everything that, in the classical humanist‐philosophical tradition, makes human beings supposedly stand out from nature qua nature, material or animal. Accordingly Husserl says of the distinction of soul and spirit that it “is the fundamental one in this entire group.”196 This at first surprising remark (is not the distinction of “nature” and “spirit” in fact the most important?) is motivated by the fact that the soul, while certainly not a “thing” in the narrowest sense, is still enveloped in the closed circuit of the natural order. The soul is still a natural being.    Related to this is the “personalistic” attitude as a variation, or rather a privileged type, of “natural attitude.” In Ideas I, we were made aware only of a division between natural and transcendental attitudes, and not of any internal division or hierarchy within the natural attitude itself. But now, in Ideas II, we learn 
                                                195 Ibid., 180 (my emphasis) 196 Ibid., 181 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that the natural attitude is divided into at least these two: the “naturalistic,” which takes its cues from natural science, and the “personalistic,” which is closer to the everyday life and everyday world in which we naively, but meaningfully, exist. Thus Husserl announces:   “[The] ‘naturalistically’ considered world is of course not the world. Rather, given prior is the world as the everyday world, and within this arise man’s theoretical interest and the sciences related to the world, among which is natural science under the ideal of truths in themselves.”197  Husserl adds immediately that “this pregiven world is investigated first [my italics] with respect to nature. Then animalia have their turn, human beings before all others.” Be that as it may, the scientific‐theoretic world of blosse Sachen is itself “reduced” out of the raw material of lived, personal and interpersonal, functionally and axiologically meaningful life, a life lived in what Husserl now calls the Umwelt (“surrounding world”).198  It is evident from various supplemental sections199 that in Ideas II, Husserl is developing his notion of “spirit” through a thinking‐through of the distinction of natural and human—that is, cultural—sciences. Husserl’s so to say concession to natural science, granting it free reign over the human soul in the forms of biology and psychology, has seemingly triggered a certain need to regain for humanity a dignity and singularity. After all, it is we who do phenomenology—or, it is in us that 




                                                200 Ibid., 298 201 Cobb‐Stevens, 252‐3 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constitute it is already to have shifted out of (so to speak) the naturalistic, and into the “personalistic,” attitude, for which the psycho‐physical composite studied in science simply does not appear in this form. It is perhaps for this reason that Husserl says (relatively) little about the interrelation of the regions of “spirit” and “soul,” but oddly, this is certainly not true about the relation of spirit to Body. Indeed, Husserl’s remarks on this particular relation are some of the most provocative but also confusing and contradictory in all of his ontological investigations. On the one hand, it might seem as though Husserl wants to claim that spirit and Body are to be distinguished in the strongest of terms:   “What we find then is ourselves as the spiritual Ego related to the stream of experiences—‘spiritual’ here is used in a mere general sense, referring to the Ego that has its place precisely not in Corporeality; e.g., I ‘think’ (cogito), i.e., I perceive, I represent in whatever mode, I judge, I feel, I will, etc., and find myself thereby as that which is one and the same in the changing of these lived experiences, as ‘subject’ of the acts and states.”202   But upon scrutiny, it appears likely that the “spiritual Ego” being referred to here is actually not human spirit at all, but the transcendental ego. Still, the mixing of the language of “spirituality” with the “I think” in its non‐Corporeality is a clue of difficulties inherent in Husserl’s conception of a “non‐natural” reality that is nonetheless different than transcendental subjectivity.  At any rate, Husserl repeatedly states the view that Body has a distinct role to play in the realm of spirit and (what amounts to the same) culture. “For phenomenology…the Body plays an expansive role in the realm of spirit.”203 For one, it is the “expression” of spirit in a most provocative sense. It is that by which one 
                                                202 Ideas II, 103 203 Ibid., 295 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grasps the humanity of a human being, the “person there, who dances, laughs when amused, and chatters…” And it is not the “apprehension of a spirit fastened to a Body,” but the apprehension of the person through his body.204 Thus I can say of man, in this attitude, that he “has a Corporeality, [he] has a body which is a physical thing with such and such qualities…” Sometimes it is not clear whether Husserl is speaking of soul or spirit, as in a nearby section he speaks of the fact that “each movement of the Body is, as Body, filled with the soul through and through… Body is full of soul.” Husserl’s point is that a personality emerges through, say, a particular Body’s movements. Husserl points out that this is true not only of the corporeal Body but of any “body” or “material thing,” such as texts, which are cultural expressions of a uniquely significant kind.205 This is a useful clue that the relation of Body and spirit that Husserl is outlining here is in fact a relation of spirit and body as (a), namely as both Körper and Leib. That is, spirit is related to the materiality of the body as well as to its soulish aspect, as Leib. The body as complex duality‐in‐unity is transformed from a “natural” complex to a “spiritual” one through a change in attitude, but in either case, it retains its Janus‐faced nature.206  
                                                204 Ibid., 252 205 Ibid., 248‐50. One may speak of art‐works or religious artifacts as well presumably. 206 In all of this we are focusing on individual spirits. Husserl himself recognizes what he calls “personalities of a higher order” or, what amounts to the same thing, collective “spirits,” such as nations, clubs, churches, families, and the like. (See for example: Ideas II, 377; or, for parallel talk of individual and collective subjects, sees Husserl 1919, 135.) This resembles the Hegelian notion of “objective spirit,” but for Husserl, communal subjectivity is founded on the interactions of individual subjects. Out of these interactions, emergently perhaps, higher “wholes” or organic unities that deserve the name of “persons” appear. Husserl seems to base this on the fact that we commonly speak of the will, desires, attitudes, etc., of groups of people organized in coherent wholes, not only of individuals. This is not merely analogous or figurative language for him. Now if true, it would radically alter our conception of what counts as a “person” and could have real legal ramifications. This would be relevant to the current debate over the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent ruling on the legal rights of “corporations” under the U.S. Constitution. (See: Citizens United v. FEC) 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Related to its sense as spiritual expression, the Body is the means by which spirit “…in its freedom moves the Body and thereby can perform a work in the spiritual world.”207 As Ricoeur notes, everything now is a “performance” of spirit.208 But this actually points to one of the more Platonist aspects of Husserl’s understanding of the Body in the personal attitude, already hinted at above. The Body is for me to “use” as “organon of my will.” And the Body in the spiritual attitude is merely “mine”; I am not of the Body:   “It is absolutely out of the question that I am here encountering or intending myself as something in the Body, as founded in it… the Body is my Body, and it is mine in the first place as my ‘over and against,’ my ob­ject, just as the house is my object, something I see or can see, something I touch or can touch, etc. These things are mine, but not as component pieces of the Ego…”209   Admittedly, this kind of description then becomes hard to square with what Husserl calls the “unity of Body and spirit.”210 But the unity of Body and spirit in particular is complex, in multiple senses (i.e. complicated, compounded) of that word:   “[The body] is at the same time a part of nature, inserted into the nexus of causality, and the spiritual life, which we grasp through the Bodily expression and understand in its nexus of motivation, appears, in virtue of its connection with the Body, to be conditioned itself by natural processes and to be apperceived as something of nature. The unity of Body and spirit is a two‐fold one, and, correlatively, a two‐fold apprehension (the personalistic and the naturalistic) is included in the unitary apperception of the human.”211   What this indicates, perhaps, is that Body and spirit are “one” only to the extent that the latter is apperceived through the former, namely via the Body’s appearing as an 













                                                216 Ideas II, 146. This would seem to rule out a separable ‘soul‐substance,” but Husserl does not allow this to prevent him from speaking, in the mode of imaginative variation, of the “departure” of the “soul” (Ibid., 100), which leaves only “dead matter” behind. Here Husserl’s point is that it is the soulish or psychic dimension of the human or animal being that makes it such, as opposed to simply “material nature.” 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psychophysical composite—is not technically a dualism, because “thing” and “animal” both go under the genus, so to speak, of “nature.” Finally, consciousness and reality do not comprise a dualism for the reasons already indicated; the first is the ground of the second, and thus they have no parity. There is no reality or world without consciousness; but there is at least conceivably consciousness without reality or world (cf. the world‐annihilation experiment, which Husserl upholds in no uncertain terms in both Ideas II and the Epilogue to the Ideas volumes).217  Rather, nature and spirit are dualistic because neither can be exhaustively explained through the other, and they do not overlap. They are both “absolutes,” correlated to alternative versions of the natural attitude, each retaining pride of place in its respective attitude.218 This is not to say one cannot find talk of an overlap between nature and spirit in Husserl; but when Husserl speaks of this, of a “spirituality in nature” for example, he is typically referring to “animal nature” and does not lose sight of the fact that such animality is a founded stratum on material nature, or, more importantly, that such “spirituality” is fundamentally outside of the realm of “culture” or the personalistic attitude, in which the body becomes mere 






















                                                228 See also Husserl 1927, 192‐5 229 Ideas II, 374 230 Ibid., 376 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Ironically, it is along these lines that commentators like Ulrich Melle and Steven Crowell in fact develop favorably humanistic interpretations of Husserl’s ontology. Nature “matters,” for Husserl, because it has significance—utility, beauty, goodness—for human beings. From this point of view, a respect for human spirit emerges indirectly as the last hope for a rescue of the environment. Thus Melle remarks:   “…it is clear that nature plays only a subordinate role for Husserl. Husserl’s idealistic conception of the relationship between nature and spirit is radically spirit‐centered. Nature in itself and independent of spirit and its meaning‐giving acts is first of all only an abstraction and secondly a mere substrate for the meaning‐giving acts and goal‐directed activities of spiritual beings…. Protection of nature for nature’s sake would therefore not make any sense to Husserl, and any naturalistic axiology and ethics is nonsensical for him.”231   In an interesting book‐length study of Husserl and the body Dodd comes to a similar conclusion, comparing Husserl’s view (favorably, one might add) to that of Plato from the Phaedo: “For, I would like to suggest, there is much in this passage [Phaedo 66b‐67b3] that should remind us of Husserl, and there is much in Husserl’s analysis of the body that should remind us of Plato, or at least of a tradition that sought to put some sort of distance (of whatever type) between body and whatever can be identified as that which we most truly are.”232    For his part, Crowell celebrates Husserl’s “disenchantment” of nature as a triumph of ethical thinking. States Crowell: “Critics of Husserl (e.g. Merleau‐Ponty) have suggested that the meaningless nature of the naturalistic attitude is an 










                                                236 Ideas II, 295 237 Ibid., 296 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“The realm of nature is the realm of the ‘phenomenal’; that means here the realm of the real unities constituted in or by means of ‘presentation.’ The realm of spirit, however, is the realm of the realities given in absolute manifestation (self‐manifestation and manifestation through comprehension), realities having behind themselves only the pure Ego as the irreal, absolute substrate of all manifestations of reality.”238   It is very possible that, as some writers have commented, Husserl has in mind something like a modified (transcendentally purified) monadological idealism along the lines of a Leibniz, whose very idea of the monad he adopts, at least in part, not only in Ideas II but most memorably in the Cartesian Meditations. But the passage just quoted does not present us with a transcendental idealism, insofar as it stresses the realm of spirit; here, we are only at the level of the natural attitude and, correlatively, reality. It goes without saying that the “dogmatic” idealism of the Leibnizian variety and the “transcendental” idealism Husserl is aiming are two radically different things, at least from Husserl’s stated perspective. The final reference to the “pure Ego” is itself unclear, due to the ambiguities in this very concept, discussed already above. A related confusion arises over how Husserl interprets the superiority of spirit in the following quote:   “Nature is a field of relativities throughout, and it can be so because these are always in fact relative to an absolute, the spirit, which consequently is what sustains all the relativities. … That is to say, if we could eliminate all the spirits from the world, then that is the end of nature. But if we eliminate nature…there always still remains something: the spirit as individual spirit.”239   



























                                                249 Husserl 1919, p. 186 (my translation) 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inert to the most “enspirit‐ed.” This would be reminiscent of the Neoplatonism‐tinged ontology of some German Romantics, or perhaps distantly of Spinozism. But if spirituality and physicality fuse or blend in the middle—in the body as “midpoint” of extension and thought, in Rabanaque’s image—then it would seem that the notion of “noematic regions” in the plural must be dispensed with altogether. For in that case material thinghood and psychic egoity would not be two distinct noematic regions at all in the first place, let alone leaving room for a third, the body.  The first, monistic view suggests a kind of vitalism, or panpsychism, that Husserl expressly rejects with respect to Leibniz (and Bruno).250 Furthermore, this would be a case in which Leiblichkeit would define the whole continuum of which extension and thought are merely poles on either end. Yet this would clearly be unacceptable to Husserl, as it would call into question the founding‐founded relationship of the physical and psychical, the latter of which being founded on the former, as well as remove the privileged perch of the Cartesian “I think.” The fact is that Husserl did posit multiple irreducible (the Priority Thesis aside) “ontological regions”—two in particular, nature and spirit. The body falls in the former column. Of course, there is one more provocative thought experiment to consider. In talking about the relation between the psyche and the body, Husserl invokes the following image:   “Let us imagine a consciousness… which would stand in relation to a locomotive, so that if the locomotive were fed water this consciousness would have the pleasant feeling that we call satiety; if the locomotive were heated, it would have the feeling of warmth, etc. Obviously, the locomotive would not, because of the make‐up of such relationships, become ‘animate organism’ for this consciousness. If, instead of the thing that I at the time call my animate organism, the locomotive 
                                                250 Ibid., 132 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stood in my consciousness as the field of my pure Ego, then I could not call it animate organism also, for it simply would not be an animate organism.”   The image has intuitive appeal, but why? Husserl immediately goes on to explain the reason the locomotive and my consciousness would not make up an animate organism at this point:    “…a considerable part of the large content‐class belonging to the sphere of consciousness under the title ‘material of consciousness’ is so intimately at one with the material animate organism that in the intuitive givenness not merely connection but precisely unity is shown.”251   Not merely connection but unity. This seems a very strong statement indeed. An animate organism is already more than a material thing in its essence. It has a “stratum” of the psychic, belonging to the whole of the organism “from the outset.” But really, all this means is that the animate organism is such that in it, its Body and soul are one. We have gone through all of this already. In spite of this “unity,” there is also, still, a founded‐founding relation between the first and second (“psychic”) stratum; they’re not equal, in this sense. This is what allows Husserl to speak of the body as a “sensing physical thing” that is “covered or filled with feelings.”252 Its materiality is primary, its psychic dimension an add‐on, albeit one woven into the essence of some beings, the “animate” ones. So unfortunately, the unity of Body and soul fails to provide the needed evidence of either a radical union of or a “middle region” between nature and spirit.253 Indeed, it is arguable that Husserl’s treatment 









































                                                258 Husserl and Merleau‐Ponty did not have a personal acquaintance, so by “relationship” I have of course been referring (and will continue to refer) throughout this chapter to the relationship between their philosophies. 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his general philosophy, such that to accept one is, to a large degree, to accept the other—or at least to be prepared to do so more readily.259 Merleau‐Ponty did not begin his philosophical career strictly as a “phenomenologist,” but he gradually grew into the role. He was interested in Husserl as early as 1934, but even as late as his first book, The Structure of Behavior, his primary focus seemingly lies elsewhere. However, reading Husserl (or about him, as through Eugen Fink’s important Kantstudien article of 1933260) evidently had a great cumulative impact on him, such that, as one chronicler notes, “[his] attention to Husserl increases rather than diminishes over the course”261 of the progression from The Phenomenology of Perception (PP), his well‐known 1945 masterpiece, to The Visible and the Invisible (VI), which was left unfinished at the time of the author’s untimely death. Unlike Eugen Fink, Martin Heidegger, Aron Gurwitsch, and other students of Husserl’s, Merleau‐Ponty did not have a personal relationship with Husserl, although he may have attended at least one of his lectures.262 Complicating matters further, Husserl was clearly only one of many influences on the sponge‐like French thinker. This is because Husserl’s 
                                                259 An important but deliberate omission from this discussion is any extended discussion of hermeneutics for its own sake. For example, I touch only indirectly the perennial question of whether there is in fact such a thing as a “correct” interpretation of a work, or even whether there is such a “work” to begin with. (Besides, Merleau‐Ponty’s is a case in which it is not the meaning of individual texts that are usually at stake but the tendencies and “inner logic” of the thinker’s corpus as a whole, an even more elusive animal.) These are surely questions that deserve replies and would have significant bearing on the present inquiry, but they also lie just outside its necessarily restricted scope.  260 See: Fink, Eugen. “Die phänomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen Kritik.” In: Fink, Eugen. Studien zur Phänomenologie 1930­1939. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966 261 The chronicler is Ted Toadvine. See “Merleau‐Ponty’s Reading of Husserl: A Chronological Overview.” In: Merleau­Ponty’s Reading of Husserl. Eds. Ted Toadvine and Lester Embree. Dodrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002 (p. 228). Hereafter “Toadvine.” (The essay collection as a whole is referred to hereafter as “Reading.”) Toadvine’s chronicle has been extremely useful for this section.  262 Ibid., pp. 227‐33 
 126 
phenomenology, largely through the influence of Sartre, was only one of many dominant philosophical options in 1940s France, when Merleau‐Ponty forged the core of his philosophical vision.263  Nevertheless, Husserl’s influence turned out to be the most decisive in the end. In the “Preface” of PP, Merleau‐Ponty adopted the fundamental Husserlian insights and concepts, working them into his own brand of “existential” phenomenology, and he was the first so‐called “outsider” to be granted private and in‐depth access to Husserl’s archives in Louvain, which were at that time filled with reams of unpublished material that Merleau‐Ponty happily devoured and communicated, fragmentarily, to a wider circle of scholars and intellectuals.264 Merleau‐Ponty’s reading of Husserl is critical of some of Husserl’s tendencies, particularly what have been variously labeled and identified as his rationalism, idealism, essentialism, and foundationalism. Merleau‐Ponty disliked each of these “styles” of thinking, but he clearly regarded Husserl as “more than the sum” of these philosophical parts. It is also true, however, that each of the above labels can be challenged as overly simplistic stereotypes when applied to Husserl, as they all apply chiefly (though by no means exclusively) to the early published works of Husserl during his, primarily, “static phenomenology” period—most especially, 











                                                267 My placement of a treatment of the secondary literature first, before a direct analysis of the primary texts, is motivated by my hope that it will be useful to have the context in which the signficance of such an analysis can be duly measured. The review is restricted mostly to recent literature, both for reasons of limited space as well as to make it as current as possible. 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B. The “Strong View”: Zahavi, Smith, and Barbaras  Dan Zahavi, while acknowledging differences between the two thinkers, surprisingly (given his strong “Husserlian” credentials) stresses the continuity between them and argues that Merleau‐Ponty’s reading of Husserl is in many ways prescient and ahead of its times.268 For his part, A. D. Smith argues that Merleau‐Ponty’s ideas in PP are fundamentally Husserlian, though stated with a different emphasis and through different rhetoric. He also argues that Husserl has the resources to account for the special signficance accorded by Merleau‐Ponty to the “bodily schema,” against the view of Shaun Gallagher, for example.269 Both Zahavi and Smith have in common a vast command over the Husserliana archives, and hence call upon material that cannot be expected to be known by even some advanced phenomenologists. The pivotal Ideas II has come to be increasingly well‐known, of course, but there are on this front detractors of the Stein‐ and Landgrebe‐edited volume we have before us today.270  In addition to Zahavi and Smith, who write primarily on Husserl, there is also the case of a Merleau‐Pontian who fully acknowledges the profundity of the link between the two philosophers, namely Renaud Barbaras. Thus in the conclusion of his book De l’être du phénomène, Barbaras states: “…Merleau‐Ponty’s ontology does 






















                                                284 Ibid., 545 285 Ibid., 540. The original citation is from Primacy, 29. Watson also cites Gurwitsch’s well‐known remark to the effect that the “life‐world” in Husserl cannot be understood apart from its polemical relation to the scientific attitude. 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For Embree’s view, I will simply reproduce an expanded version of the quote provided at the outset of this chapter:   “It is daunting to recall the historical era in American phenomenology of our youth that is best called ‘Phenomenology and Existentialism’ if only because, in that great upsurge of energy, Husserl was, incredibly, read by so many as the father of existential phenomenology, a paternity that still needs challenging. That was challenged chiefly on the basis of what Merleau‐Ponty confected in reference to a book whose English title actually is The Crisis of the European Sciences. No competent reader can study the present work [an introduction to Husserl’s phenomenology] and fail to comprehend (a) that Husserl’s was from about 1905 through to the end of his life a transcendental philosophy and (b) that Husserl’s focus was in the philosophy of science. Existential phenomenology is not transcendental and, although not lacking in interest in science theory, is more concerned with human existence.”286   Several things can be said to challenge these sentiments, though none definitive. For example, on one reading, Merleau‐Ponty does not renounce the transcendental attitude, and at times in fact embraces it explicitly.287 On this view, it is the “absoluteness” or “priority” of it that he challenges, not its rightful place in phenomenological praxis. Also, it is arguable that Merleau‐Ponty’s intensive engagement with the sciences—at least at the first‐order level (meaning, the creative interpretation of its “results”)—not only matches but surpasses that of Husserl himself.288 Finally, to argue that Husserl was concerned with “science” as opposed to “human existence” might be a false dilemma, especially in Merleau‐






                                                289 For the expression “good ambiguity,” see Primacy, 11. 290 “Merleau‐Ponty’s Ontological Reading of Constitution in Phénoménologie de la perception.” In MR, p. 31 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perpetuate a climate of interpretation in which Husserlian themes and terms are typically approached in light of received philosophical problems and received ways of posing them, all at the expense of the possibility of appropriating phenomenology as a living research horizon.” (Behnke, 49‐50)    Read closely, this emerges as a particularly stinging critique of Merleau‐Ponty, at least qua “phenomenologist.” By not consulting “experiential evidence for ourselves” or, what Behnke mentions just before, cleaving to “description” rather than “explanation” (Behnke, 49), Merleau‐Ponty is perhaps not so much a “phenomenologist” at all, but closer to a simple dogmatist, that is a metaphysician who engages in “received philosophical problems and received ways of posing them.” Behnke’s sticking point is Merleau‐Ponty’s abandonment of Husserl’s strict methodological directives, something neither he nor I would entirely dispute. Behnke adds yet another dark twist, however, by suggesting, like Embree, that the reception of Merleau‐Ponty as a representative phenomenologist has damaged Husserl’s legacy. Obviously Behnke is not trying to cast aspersions on Merleau‐Ponty himself, but simply to describe what she sees as a case of all‐too‐successful appropriation (her word) of Husserl’s program. But Merleau‐Ponty has, in Behnke’s words, performed a “disservice” to Husserl’s work.291 There is perhaps a certain assumption here that Husserl’s own self‐defined project—without intervention by Merleau‐Ponty—is vital on its own, a powerful philosophical system or methodology that has been overshadowed by an inferior product. However, it is not clear in this case that Merleau‐Ponty would have marked out any sort of 




                                                292 Seebohm, Thomas M. “The Phenomenological Movement: A Tradition without Method? Merleau‐Ponty and Husserl.” In MR (p. 59) 293 Ibid., p. 55 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face by giving him a kind of “face‐lift”!) If it is being implied that this kind of face‐saving, well‐intentioned as it may be, is nonetheless counter‐productive, because for example it tends to mislead readers as to what Husserl really meant, then we come full circle back to Behnke’s criticism about legacy and occlusion. The “face‐saving” hypothesis is tempting, given Merleau‐Ponty’s generally non‐confrontational style of engaging friends and enemies alike, but it faces a real difficulty: why should Merleau‐Ponty have felt obliged to discuss Husserl in the first place, and to the extent that he does? Out of some strange emotional attachment to Husserl, a man he had never met, and whose work he had every reason to downplay with respect to figures like Heidegger, Hegel, and others?294 This does not seem wholly convincing. If there is any personal responsibility Merleau‐Ponty would feel towards Husserl, it would probably be as a grateful student to a (virtual) teacher. Having benefitted from reading Husserl’s private meditations in the Husserl archives, concealed to most of the public, and which often conflicted with the tendencies of the published works, Merleau‐Ponty probably felt increasingly responsible to revivify Husserl in the eyes of a public that remembers him in a one‐sided way. This is the distinct impression that I get as I read the opening of the PS. He did not have to cite Husserl as often as he does, but not to have done so would have eventually appeared, to many, as a bit dishonest, given the role Husserl plays in his own thinking. And if it is true that Merleau‐Ponty’s thought is a kind of “deconstruction” of Husserl, Merleau‐Ponty himself does not really give this indication. Even when he 

















                                                297 See: “The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences.” (Tr. James Edie) In “Perception,” p. 24. This was a talk (and ensuing discussion) originally recorded in 1947, shortly after the publication of PP. Hereafter “Primacy.” 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In a certain way, this passage conveys the essence of Merleau‐Ponty’s philosophy of man298: the enigmatic nexus of the inner life of consciousness and the outer being of Nature, the ambiguous middle‐space in which human existence unfolds and (partially) finds itself. In Merleau‐Ponty’s view, Husserl saw the same enigma, and increasingly came to see that it could not be solved through an appeal to “absolute consciousness,” a reflective‐constitutive “possession” of the world,299 any more than it could be solved by scientific naturalism and its deterministic laws. Hence the “existential” thrust of Merleau‐Pontian phenomenology and the persistent Merleau‐Pontian claim that Husserl himself enters “existentialism” in the third, “life‐world”‐themed phase of his philosophy. But how does Merleau‐Ponty get all of this from Husserl, and how does he parlay it into a new vision of “human reality”? The current section is one of two that reconstruct Merleau‐Ponty’s philosophy as a “Husserlian” phenomenology. Because Merleau‐Ponty generally writes pieces and not piecemeal (a reflection of his largely becoming an essayist between PP and VI), it is important to examine this material text by text; but at the same time, this approach tends to occlude the genuinely systematic way he engages with the principal themes of Husserl’s phenomenology, such as the two reductions. I have thus tried to combine both approaches—textual‐historical and thematic‐systematic—by organizing the second section around the same material discussed 




                                                300 In terms of texts, I will draw primarily on the “Preface” to PP, the essays PS and “Phenomenology and the Human Sciences” (In The Primacy of Perception. Ed. John Wild. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964; hereafter “PSM”), and VI. (Note: I will be citing from the paperback edition of the Smith translation of PP; amazingly, page numbers of the hardcover and paperback editions for the most part do not align.) 301 After all, he explicitly relegates Being and Time (Heidegger being the other major phenomenological alternative to Husserl, excepting Sartre, who himself appropriates Husserl and Heidegger) to the status of a detailed development of Husserl’s own philosophy. This stated preference for Husserl over Heidegger (and Scheler) is repeated elsewhere, for example, in PSM: “Husserl, who defined philosophy as the suspension of our affirmation of the world, recognized the actual being of the philosopher in the world much more clearly than Heidegger, who devoted himself to the study of being in the world.” (PSM, 94) Merleau‐Ponty calls Heidegger “dogmatic” in the same passage. This attitude towards Heidegger suggests that Merleau‐Ponty is, in a way, “taking Heidegger back” for Husserl. Thus when Merleau‐Ponty uses a term like “being‐in‐the‐world” or “facticity” in the “Preface,” it is always, ironically, to the benefit of Husserl. Against those who would argue for an equal Husserl and Heidegger (at least the Heidegger of Being and Time) influence on the thinker, I think these indications help dispel that impression, though there is admittedly much room for debate on the matter. 302 Lest we imagine this to be a veiled attack on Husserl, we need only consult a later footnote later in which Merleau‐Ponty defines Husserl himself as “existentialist”—in his last or “third” period of 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On what basis does Merleau‐Ponty argue for a specifically existentialist understanding of phenomenology? In a footnote (one of many with revealing remarks about Husserl) later in the book, Merleau‐Ponty explains the link as follows:   “Husserl’s originality lies beyond his notion of intentionality; it is to be found in the elaboration of this notion and the discovery, beneath the intentionality of representations, of a deeper intentionality, which others have called existence.” (PP 141n)   This “deeper intentionality” is of course what Merleau‐Ponty variously calls “motor intentionality” or “operative intentionality,” the spontaneous, pre‐conscious (or “anonymous”—another Husserlian word) intentionality of the body oriented towards its environment. Husserl himself had a great deal to say about such “operative intentionality”—it is in fact his idea. Thus Merleau‐Ponty is—under this meaning of “existence”—merely emphasizing a certain line of Husserlian investigation.   One of the consistent themes of Merleau‐Ponty’s thinking—it is, in fact, one of the fundamental premises of his general philosophical outlook—is his opposition to “idealism.” The reason—or one of them—is that of the “opacity” of the world to consciousness. Idealisms (speaking now especially of the “transcendental” rather than “phenomenalist” sort) manage to render consciousness “transparent” to the 
                                                philosophizing, that is. Indeed, this “tripartite” division of Husserl’s thought becomes, as we have already seen, a regular motif in Merleau‐Ponty’s Husserl‐interpretation. For as in PP, in PSM Merleau‐Ponty singles out for their importance Husserl’s “last ten years” (PSM 46), though he also claims that “from the beginning to the end of his career, Husserl tried to discover a way between logicism and psychologism” (PSM 48)—that is, between strict logical necessity and the pure contingency of facts. Thus it is useful to note that already in the “Preface” Merleau‐Ponty makes reference to Husserl as a contradictory philosopher. (PP viii) 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world.303 Merleau‐Ponty’s opposition to “idealism” is therefore clear, but whose “idealism” he is referring to—Kant’s or Husserl’s, for example—is not. There are some who take it to be motivated against Husserl304, but A. D. Smith, to take an excellent recent example, shows convincingly that it is only a Kantian (or Neo‐Kantian) kind of idealism—which Merleau‐Ponty targets repeatedly throughout PP as the quintessential form of “intellectualism”—that threatens to imply this kind of transparency, namely by building it into perception as a condition of any sort of experience at all.305 Husserl’s opposition to Kantian “humanist” constructivism in fact paves the way for Merleau‐Ponty’s own appreciation of perception as an “openness” to the world. (PP xix) We are open to the world, but it is not enclosed within us or pre‐fitted to our categorial thought. This is exactly why the determination of the world through essences is always fraught with peril and shot through with contingency.306 But it is also why Husserl’s return to the “things themselves” is so important and revolutionary.  







                                                307 PS 159‐161. Both of these positions have the common premise of  “positivism”—here, another word for “objectivism”—according to which, I take him to mean, there is some fully determinate and finished text before us, which we may either duplicate or distort, but nothing in between. 308 Reading Merleau‐Ponty on the “unthought,” Bergo echoes the common view when she states that “the question of Merleau‐Ponty’s reading… is a question of finding the latencies in the text and developing them such that they appear to bring to light an unthought dimension.” (Bergo 158‐9) Taken on its own, this is too simplistic. This becomes evident when one observes the sheer volume of 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As we have seen already, Merleau‐Ponty consistently maintained the belief that Husserl evolved over time into the “existential” Husserl of the “life‐world” philosophy. In reference to Husserl’s idea of the life‐world Merleau‐Ponty urges:   “These late analyses are neither scandalous nor even disturbing if we remember everything which foretold them from the start. They make explicit that ‘world’s thesis’ prior to every thesis and theory, this side of understanding’s objectifications, which Husserl has always spoken of, and which has simply become in his eyes our sole recourse in the impasse into which these objectifications have led Western knowledge.” (PS 180)   He knows that Husserl would protest. Hence, later on, we encounter this revealing phraseology: “Willy‐nilly, against his plans and according to his essential audacity, Husserl awakens a wild‐flowering world and mind.” (PS 188‐9, my italics) Husserl’s later thought—very much building on the earlier—suggests a new direction without necessarily fully taking it. Merleau‐Ponty revels in showing through liberal quotations that in Ideas II, Husserl freely grants ontological priority to material Nature over Spirit in one breath, even as he prioritizes transcendental consciousness in another. (PS 164‐5, 171) From these and other hints he concludes that: “Husserl’s thought is as much attracted by the haecceity of Nature as by the vortex of absolute consciousness.” (PS 165) Merleau‐Ponty then stresses the mutual “encroachment” (PS 176) and reciprocal Fundierung (PS 173, 176‐7) of different orders of being, sensible and ideal,309 citing Husserl’s own words again to seal the case. (PS 177)   
                                                quotations Merleau‐Ponty uses in a way that employs their literal and overt meaning. One is tempted to say that so many of Husserl’s “latencies” manifest themselves quite well! 309 It would of course take a detailed study of Ideas II (as undertaken in Chapter 2) to confirm Merleau‐Ponty’s reading of it; but even a noted Husserl scholar like Steven Galt Crowell concedes that there is at least the appearance of this sort of paradox in the text: “In the course of his attempt to 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PSM, an essay from 1961, offers a more prosaic but also thoroughly revelatory assessment of Husserlian thought and his own self‐circumscription within its berth. It represents the thinker’s mature conclusions on one of the major themes of phenomenology since its inception, namely its precise relation (or non‐relation, as the case may be) to the sciences—both natural and “human.”310 It is primarily psychology that Merleau‐Ponty is concerned with, not surprisingly (given his long engagement with Gestalt psychology in particular). The central problematic here is the “paradox” of essence and fact. The essay is particularly illuminating because of the way it demonstrates Merleau‐Ponty’s strategy of striking a “middle way”—through, and not despite Husserl—between historicism and relativism, on the one hand, and essentialism (and, implicitly, determinism), on the other. What Merleau‐Ponty wants to maintain, and claims that Husserl himself achieves even if belatedly, is truth in the midst of indeterminacy, essence within existence, and, strikingly, “eternity” along with “contingency.” (PSM 92) In all of this, he views the human sciences sympathetically (and in fact all sciences—there is no clear separation made here between natural and human sciences ontologically speaking, even if their methodologies differ). The reason for this sympathetic view is that 
                                                determine the idea of nature in Ideas II, Husserl encounters an apparent “vicious circle”… Are persons “components of nature,” then, “subordinated” to it, or does the very constitution of nature presuppose the non‐natural realm of spirit?” See: Crowell, Steven Galt. “The Mythical and the Meaningless: Husserl and the Two Faces of Nature.” In Issues in Husserl’s Ideas II. Eds. Thomas Nenon and Lester Embree. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996 (p. 81).  310 By the “sciences of man” Merleau‐Ponty has primarily psychology and, to a lesser degree, sociology and ethology in mind. Another lecture course entitled “Phenomenology and Sociology” focuses on some other aspects of the same problem, this time emphasizing the namesake science, though it uses much of the same language as PSM, and is much shorter. Of course, what is arguably most important of all for Merleau‐Ponty is the relation of philosophy to history. But although we call history one of the “humanities” as opposed to “social sciences,” it is precisely the empirical, contingent factor of historicality that makes it akin to the human sciences in Merleau‐Ponty’s sense. This is also why he treats the threat of “historicism” along with that of “relativism” as he opens the essay. 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human sciences, in their own way, are doing precisely the same balancing act, albeit without the self‐reflective anxiety that philosophy brings with it. It is in this sense that Merleau‐Ponty declares that there is no clear dividing line between the two. (PSM 72) Once again he seems to be at odds with Husserl, who insists on the separateness of transcendental phenomenology from all sciences, but Merleau‐Ponty tells a different story that relies, as usual, heavily on “evolutionary developments” within Husserl himself. Merleau‐Ponty sees a burgeoning recognition in Husserl of the “reciprocal envelopment” of psychology and phenomenology but also, more broadly, fact and essence. Thus he makes several detours to chronicle the story of Husserl’s “profound development” away from absolute essentialism, for example with the case of language311. (PSM 80)  In PSM, what is key to note in all of this is not just what Merleau‐Ponty says but why he is saying it: he draws Husserl into his own fight against the naturalism of psychology and the empirical sciences, invokes him to make his own case—indeed, to defend his own phenomenological approach to the questions at hand. It is in this light that we can appreciate Merleau‐Ponty’s description of phenomenology itself as a negotiated mean between skepticism and absolutism. Merleau‐Ponty does not so much want to modify the phenomenological method as bring it into living contact with the rest of the intellectual conversation:  “Husserl is seeking to reaffirm rationality at the level of experience, without sacrificing the vast variety that it includes and accepting all the processes of conditioning which psychology, sociology, and history reveal. It is a question of finding a method that will enable us to think at the same time of 










                                                314 Again for this chapter, as for the rest of this dissertation, I am not making a distinction, as Merleau‐Ponty did not, between the “phenomenological” and the “transcendental” reductions, but rather am treating them as one. 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gives us over to our existential selfhood. And this is why the phenomenological reduction “belongs to existentialist philosophy.” I don’t think we should undervalue the fact that Merleau‐Ponty endorses the phenomenological reduction. Indeed, he regards it as central to his philosophy. It is, after all, the reduction that brings us to the “natural attitude” before “naturalism” and its blosse Sachen. (PS 163) It is what allows us to “slacken the intentional threads which attach us to the world” ever too tightly to see ourselves. (PP xv) He later describes the reduction in similar terms as “the link, which is indeed a schism[,] established by life between our thought and our physical and social situation,” adding that it nevertheless “never leads us in any way to negate time or pass beyond it into a realm of pure logic or pure thought.” (PSM 49) In other words, then, Merleau‐Ponty accepts even the “schismatic” aspect of the reduction315, so long as it is not taken to mark a total departure from the finitude of lived horizons.  Merleau‐Ponty’s reduction consists in two movements: the movement “out of” nature—that is, the moment in which one breaks out of one’s “natural” condition, the passive slumber of everyday life; and the movement back into it, that is, to a recognition of one’s finitude.316 Initially, through bracketing and the shift from the natural attitude to the transcendental attitude, I “see” or “gain possession of myself”; reflection sharpens my consciousness and brings it into self‐
                                                315 Indeed, Merleau‐Ponty insists elsewhere that “the sensible order is being at a distance” (PS 167‐8) in order to stress the futility of teleological accounts of the world that bind the “inner” and the “outer” by a secret “aim.” 316 One might call this a “circle of finitude” which, moreover, bears obvious and open affinities with aspects of Hegelian thought. 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consciousness. But the self is not apart from nature; in some way it cannot account for itself, it belongs to nature even as it (apparently) transcends it.  The second part of this movement is what Merleau‐Ponty thinks must be reasserted against certain trends—and not just those of “transcendental Husserl”:   “…the essential difference between my point of view and that of a philosophy of understanding is that, in my view, even though consciousness is able to detach itself from things to see itself, human consciousness never possesses itself in complete detachment and does not recover itself at the level of culture except by recapitulating the expressive, discrete, and contingent operations by means of which philosophical questioning itself has become possible.” (Primacy 40)   Closely tied up with the phenomenological reduction is the dialectic of the “natural attitude” and the “transcendental attitude.” Merleau‐Ponty’s understanding of these attitudes preserves elements of both continuity and discontinuity between them, in keeping with the paradoxical nature of the reduction.317 On the one hand, the reduction takes us beyond natural attitude, but this is only “half the truth.” (PS 162) Merleau‐Ponty’s considered judgment is that “It is the natural attitude which, by reiterating its own procedures, seesaws in phenomenology. It is the natural attitude itself which goes beyond itself in phenomenology—and so it does not go beyond itself.” (PS 164) The transcendental attitude is not abandoned or declared nonsense; but one attitude does not relate to the other as “false” to “true.”318 In the 





                                                319 Merleau‐Ponty critiques the annihilation of the world experiment (see, for example, PS 173‐4) but otherwise gives even the description of the reduction in Ideas I a warm reception. (See PSM 56) 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“…let us repeat that we reproach the philosophy of reflection not only for transforming the world into a noema, but also for distorting the being of the reflecting ‘subject’ by conceiving it as ‘thought’—and finally for rendering unthinkable its relations with other ‘subjects’ in the world that is common to them.” (VI 43)   It may seem now that Merleau‐Ponty, after years of “face‐saving” acrobatics, is now “finally” jettisoning Husserl for good. But the fact is that none of Merleau‐Ponty’s criticisms here are new. Merleau‐Ponty has already rejected transcendental idealism in PP, with its assumptions of the “transparency” of the world to reflective thought.320 Indeed, the ghost of the “Preface” haunts this chapter of the VI in more ways than this: “It is essential to the reflective analysis that it start from a de facto situation” (VI 44) and “The search for the conditions of possibility is in principle posterior to actual experience…” (VI 45) are nothing more than restatements of the “existential” turn taken in PP and already discussed above. But a careful reading of this chapter reveals that Merleau‐Ponty’s real target is Kantian constructivism, which he gives credit to Husserl for piercing through:   “This is what Husserl brought frankly into the open… that is: every effort to comprehend the spectacle of the world from within and from the sources demands that we detach ourselves from the effective unfolding of our perceptions and from our perception of the world, that we cease being one with the concrete flux of our life in order to retrace the total bearing and principal articulations of the world upon which it opens.” (VI 45)  Indeed, Merleau‐Ponty is not so much against “reflection” (or the transcendental attitude) as he is against a certain philosophy of reflection which effectively excises all consideration for the role of the “pre‐reflective” in epistemological life. This is the 


































































                                                331 Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. Nature: Course Notes from the Collège de France. Compiled and with notes from Dominique Séglard. Tr. Rober Vallier. Northwestern University Press: Evanston, Illinois, 2003. (p. 204) Hereafter designated as “N” in all citations, and “the Nature lectures” inside the body. 332 Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. The Visible and the Invisible. Tr. Alphonso Lingis. Northwestern University Press: Evanston, Illinois, 1969. Hereafter “VI.” 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to VI. It is true that the lectures were not intended to be published as a book precisely in the form we have them, but it is also true that Merleau‐Ponty intended to use much of the material from them as parts of his published writings, including sections of VI itself.333 From a detailed examination of both texts I conclude that Merleau‐Ponty’s often commented‐upon rejection of dualism—which of course hardly distinguishes him in the history of philosophy both before and after Descartes—is in fact most properly characterized as a philosophy of complementarity, one that seeks to understand the principles of identity and difference, both in the broadest of ontological contexts as well as narrower ones (such as the ontology of the body), in a way that does justice to the role that each of them plays in the structuration of Being, that is, the structure of the “visible/invisible” world. This discussion will also take us well into the fifth chapter and dissertation conclusion, which ascertain the “upshot” of Merleau‐Ponty’s dialectic for the phenomenological method.   It is my view that Merleau‐Ponty’s phenomenology is “dialectical” but in a wholly new sense, one that is driven by the exigencies of thinking the “natural” origins of subjectivity (in the sense of spirit, or human consciousness) from within, and of thereby recasting the phenomenological project as one that inheres in “ontology” in a broader sense. From the course and progression of the Nature lectures, one can see Merleau‐Ponty’s thought grow more organicist—concerned 



















                                                336 Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. The Phenomenology of Perception. Tr. Colin Smith. New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962 (Hereafter “PP.”) 337 Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. The Structure of Behavior. Tr. A.L. Fisher. Boston: Beacon Press, 1963. For a good discussion of that text with respect to Merleau‐Ponty’s philosophy of nature, see: Toadvine, Ted. Merleau­Ponty’s Philosophy of Nature. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2009 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After that earlier work, however, Merleau‐Ponty took his point of departure more explicitly from Husserl and the phenomenological reduction, as we have already seen. PP is essentially motivated by the paradox of perception whereby the world—the things—become really (and not merely “subjectively,” as through a representation) available to me, despite the fact that they are transcendent to me. This specifically phenomenological paradox made it necessary to rethink the real nature of the “I‐think” or ego who perceives—far from being a disembodied cogito, the “I” must be a body, the “body‐subject,” whose very being is worldly in the same sense that the world’s is. Body and world form a circuit, a system of reciprocity, which, as we will see, Merleau‐Ponty continues in the later writings to meditate on intensively, though with reference to what he terms an essential “fold” or “hollow” in Being.338  However, on its own, PP is, in a certain respect, locked in its own form of Husserl‐inherited subjectivism, permitting the world to arise in consciousness, albeit pre‐intentionally (or through a deeper “motor” or “operative” intentionality), but not explaining at all how it is that this world, or transcendent Being, could and does give rise to consciousness—and, more basically, to organic life. That phenomenology instructs itself explicitly to avoid this kind of question does not prevent Merleau‐Ponty from broaching it fulsomely anyway. Dupond describes 






















                                                341 Compare: “Not only must Nature become vision, but human being must also become Nature…” (N 47) And notice the phraseology here: “Becoming‐nature of man which is the becoming‐man of nature.” (N 185) 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in (or as) nature. Rather, it is an “obscure principle” that unfolds partially in consciousness, yet also partially outside of it—because it is more “ancient” than consciousness itself and stands in irreducible tension with it.    Schelling’s philosophy of Nature thus teaches Merleau‐Ponty key lessons about the limits of objective thought and of reflection, which objectify nature but must fail to capture its depths. Thus, invoking Schelling, Merleau‐Ponty observes:   “A poetic consciousness recognizes that it does not possess its object totally, that it can understand it only by a true creation, and that it creates clarity by an operation that is not deductive but creative. Poetic consciousness, overcome by its object, must get hold of itself again, but without ever being able to separate itself from its history.”342 (N 50)   The theme of non‐coincidence of reflection and object‐of‐reflection is of course a major one in Merleau‐Ponty’s later ontology (and epistemology) generally, lying at the root of his conception of “hyper‐reflection” and the method of “interrogation.” What Merleau‐Ponty finds, in other words, is that Schelling’s is a “phenomenology of pre‐reflexive Being” (N 41) that effects a “reflection on what is not reflection.” (N 45) Thus Merleau‐Ponty’s own particular fascination with Schelling does not lie simply with the latter’s anti‐Cartesianism but also, one might say, with his anti‐Kantianism (and anti‐idealism generally).343 Schelling, like Merleau‐Ponty, denies that consciousness is coextensive with meaning. (Husserl, with genetic phenomenology and the concept of the “life‐world” lying beneath the constructions 


















                                                349 “This book [Anatomy and the Problem of Behavior] has still not been exceeded, but we haven’t yet measured all its weight.” (N 140) 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the possible in the organism.” This notion of “the possible,” a “what it can do” that “is realized at the same time” as the lizard develops physiologically, already places us, Merleau‐Ponty points out, “beyond the physiological definition of the organism by its real functioning.” (N 144) Merleau‐Ponty sees here the importance of a sense of the totality of the organism, one that is immanent already in the organism’s behavioral as well as anatomical development, even in the earliest phases. But he does not want to suggest a simple teleology, for reasons that will become clearer as we proceed.    It is useful in all of this to have before one’s mind one of Merleau‐Ponty’s favorite images or metaphors for the kind of wholeness or totality that he has in mind, namely that of the melody. The melody is a metaphor for the organism; indeed, Merleau‐Ponty adapts it from famous biologist and ethologist Jakob von Uexküll, who says of the Naturfaktor—his own explanatory notion for organic development—that it is not an entelechy but a “melody singing itself.” (N 173) What is key about the melody is this: “At the moment when the melody begins, the last note is there, in its own manner.” (N 174) This is clear enough: a “first note” of a melody is not the first note without the complete melody’s being at least implied—even if not yet fully thought out, since the melody may be in the middle of being created!350 (This of course is one of the reasons that Merleau‐Ponty opposes teleology or “finalism”: that it presupposes a completeness that does not make intelligible the imperfections of the processes of either natural productivity or 





                                                351 There are several stunning “holistic” metaphors and images in VI, for example that of mirrors facing one another, in which we find “…a couple more real than either of [the mirrors individually].” (VI 139) 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“Life would be Spirit‐in‐itself, and Spirit would be life for‐itself. But life is not yet Spirit in‐itself. We find in Hegel the same retrospective illusion as in Aristotle. To grasp life in the things is to grasp a lack in the things as such.” (N 157)   What Merleau‐Ponty seems to mean is here 1) that the organism lacks an “in‐itself,” and hence (obviously) cannot be the “in‐itself” of Spirit, and 2) that this “lack” constitutes (or is a condition of) what it means to be “alive.” This negativity is intertwined with a certain interiority; for there is “…a natural negativity, an interiority of the living organism…” (N 210) But this is not to say that life is a “for‐itself,” a consciousness. Just as Nature was said to be neither subject nor object, the same holds for the organism as such. (We might recall that Husserl struggled with this very issue in Ideas II, when discussing animality and the soul.) But this interiority has to do with the symbolic depth of living beings, a meaning‐generativity which is reflected in the structure of behavior (and the quasi‐interiority of the Umwelt352), not in the presence of a (substantial) “consciousness.” Comparing machines and animals (excepting the limit‐case as it were of the simplest of organisms, which Merleau‐Ponty calls “animal‐machines”), the philosopher 















                                                353 Mereau‐Ponty’s references to this trope and to reversibility are frequent. Some of the most interesting in the texts we are examining include the following: N 217; N 224; VI 272; VI 141‐2; VI 147, 148; VI 4 154, 155; VI 223. 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reach coincidence; the coincidence eclipses at the moment of realization, and one of two things always occurs: either my right hand really passes over into the ranks of the touched, or it retains its hold on the world, but then I do not really touch it—my right hand touching, I palpate with my left hand only its outer covering.” (VI 148)  Thus while it is true that we cannot truly “see ourselves seeing,” in that the eye cannot bend its vision back upon itself, neither, finally can touch.354 And to the extent that either sense is reversible, it is reversible in this complex manner—that is, with a combination of identity and difference. As for the relation of touch and vision to one another, Merleau‐Ponty notes that while they are in some sense incommensurable (we will see below that he makes similar remarks concerning all of the senses taken together), they are nonetheless united in one aesthesiological nexus, rendering back to us a unified world: “Since the same body sees and touches, visible and tangible belong to the same world.” (VI 134) Reversibility is, of course, a phenomenon we notice first of all with regard to the body, which for its part is “…interposed [not as] a thing, an interstitial matter, a connective tissue, but a sensible for itself…” (VI 135) The lived body is thus always already “aware” of itself and the world, which, through its Umwelt, is “present” before it immanently and not merely as an externality. But Merleau‐Ponty’s discourse about the “body‐subject,” while legitimate in its own right, had tended to obscure the “world” side of this (literal) equation. The world, nature, the sensible—these are the complementary poles to the body, the mind, and sentience. Therefore what we find above all in the later writings is Merleau‐Ponty’s parlaying the insight 

















                                                359 In one place he even equates the flesh with Nature. He tells himself: “Do a psychoanalysis of Nature: it is the flesh, the mother.” (VI 267) Merleau‐Ponty broaches the concept of the flesh towards the end of his third Nature lecture, itself contemporaneous with the writing of the draft of VI. Indeed, some of his most revealing thoughts on the flesh occur in these lectures. 360 Fred Evans makes much the same point when he observes: “The flesh holds seers and the visible together (they are of the same flesh), while still respecting their difference and keeping them apart (as respectively, the flesh of the body and the flesh of the world).” Evans, Fred. “Chiasm and Flesh.” 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is at the heart of reversibility also explains why Merleau‐Ponty calls the flesh the “miracle that is the sense organ.” (N 209) As we have seen, the sense organ, for example the skin in its tactility, demonstrates this reversibility in a paradigmatic way.   The identity, as it were, of intertwining and separation (ségrégation) is parallel with that of distance and proximity, which defines our strange intimacy with things, even as they remain outside what in Husserlian parlance is called the “sphere of immanence.” Indeed, Merleau‐Ponty takes the notion of an “immanent transcendency” of things in consciousness to its logical conclusion:   “By definition perception puts us in the presence of a definitively opaque term. In other words, the Nature that we perceive is as distant and as close as possible, and for the same reasons. There is nothing between me and the Nature that I perceive. When I perceive a thing, I cannot conceive of a perception interposed between me and the object.” (N 118)   He reiterates the same idea in the VI:   “…this distance is not the contrary of this proximity, it is deeply consonant with it, it is synonymous with it.” (VI 135)   And in a similar vein:  Vision does not completely blend into visible; nonetheless we are close to it, palpation, gaze envelops things, clothes them with its own flesh. (VI 131)  










                                                363 VI 268. Elsewhere Merleau‐Ponty refers to this “explosion” as the “dehiscence” or “écart” that marks the flight of being from itself—which is nevertheless, as Hegel says, a return to itself. See also: “The true philosophy [is to] apprehend what makes the leaving of oneself be a retiring into oneself, and vice versa./Grasp this chiasm, this reversal. That is the  mind.” (VI 199) Relatedly, elsewhere Merleau‐Ponty describes the flesh as an “anonymity innate to myself.” (VI 139) 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example, with regard to nature within and without: “By the nature in us, we can know Nature, and reciprocally it is from ourselves that living beings and even space speak to us…”364 (N 205) Central to this notion is the ultimate continuity of the visible and the invisible: “The superficial pellicle of the visible is only for my vision and for my body. But the depth beneath this surface contains my body and hence contains my vision. My body as a visible thing is contained within the full spectacle.” (VI 138) Again, this is a continuity “interrupted,” but not before it makes itself known as a continuity. Thus I would wholly agree with Fred Evans that “…the direction of truth Merleau‐Ponty speaks of, even if it can never be fulfilled in principle, does seem to put a premium on perceptual and epistemological convergence rather than divergence…” (Evans, 191) Of course, the notion of the flesh has generated many controversies and misunderstandings, one of them being that Merleau‐Ponty is a monist and that the flesh is, as already alluded to negatively above, a kind of ontological substrate. Merleau‐Ponty certainly is a non­dualist; he does not use the word, now associated with strains of “Eastern” (especially Buddhist) philosophy, but I think this much can be admitted. For example, he makes clear in one place: “There is no intelligible world, there is the sensible world.”365 (VI 214)  Yet from this alone it does not follow that Merleau‐Ponty is a monist. His point in this quote, for example, is that the “invisible” is of this world, it is “that which inhabits this world, sustains it, and renders it visible, its own and interior possibility, the Being of this [visible, sensible] 







                                                366 There is something analogous in Merleau‐Ponty’s description of what Matisse’s method of painting and the “body of behavior” in the organism have in common: “Threads are tied up, which come from everywhere, and which constitute independent forms, and the same time, he finds that these threads realize something which has a unity.” (N 154) Elsewhere: “Thus the sexual is coextensive with the human not as a unique cause, but as a dimension outside of which nothing exists.” (N 282) 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two ‘sides’ of an experience, conjugated and incompossible, but complementary. Their unity is irrecusable; it is simply as the invisible hinge on which two experiences are articulated—a self torn apart. [my emphasis] …contradiction, understood as interior to Nature, must be assumed. We must admit the idea of an operating negation in Nature...”367 (N 65‐66) Merleau‐Ponty’s use of the term “complementarity,” is not, I believe, accidental. I believe it is a deliberate reference to Bohr’s theory of quantum mechanics by the same name, a subject to which he devotes a good amount of attention in the Nature lectures themselves. (N 89‐100) In a sense, he applies what is true of sub‐atomic particles, in particular the symmetrical applicability of mutually incompatible wave‐theory and corpuscular theory to the description of elementary particles, to being itself: “…the two maps are complete, and yet they do not merge into one. The two parts are total parts and yet not superposable.” (VI 134) (Note again the idea of a “total part.”)   In an interesting kind of convergence, Husserl scholar Sebastian Luft has expressed the view that Husserl’s philosophy as a whole, with its twin poles of the “Cartesian Way” to the reduction and the “Life‐World” method, can itself be summarized in terms of two incommensurable and yet complementary “maps”:   “Thus, the interpretation [I present] attempts to overcome the common assertion that there is a ‘contradiction’ between Husserl’s Cartesian position and his account of the life‐world. I have tried to show that a philosophical thematization of the life‐world is not possible without a transcendental question as to its origin in (inter‐)subjectivity. In Husserl’s eyes, both agendas are correlative. At the same time, I would like to insist that Husserl’s Cartesian account of the subject and his life‐world ontology present two distinct and in this sense, separate programs. They are projects Husserl pursues with different aims: Whereas the ‘Cartesian Husserl’ pursues a path of scientific grounding and foundationalism, the ‘life‐world Husserl’ is interested in what can been called a hermeneutics of the world of everyday life. Both projects are set squarely against each other, not in the sense that 


























































                                                384 Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. Nature: Course Notes from the Collège de France. Compiled and with notes from Dominique Séglard. Tr. Robert Vallier. Northwestern University Press: Evanston, Illinois, 2003. Hereafter the “Nature lectures” in the body of text or “N” in citations. 385 Ibid., p. 57 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B. Paradox and the “Perceptual Faith” If the basic paradox of perception is the question of transcendence‐and‐immanence, as we have seen described above, the fact is that in perceptual faith, this is not a problem as such:   “The ‘natural’ man holds onto both ends of the chain, thinks at the same time that his perception enters into the things and that it is formed this side of his body. Yet coexist as the two convictions do without difficulty in the exercise of life, once reduced to theses and to propositions they destroy one another and leave us in confusion.” (VI 8)   Merleau‐Ponty interestingly calls our natural certitude “unjustifiable”: an “unjustifiable certitude of a sensible world common to us that is the seat of truth within us.”386 It is “unjustifiable” of course because it is primordial—presupposed in any justification (especially the justification of the “skeptic,” which we will see pointed out below).   Merleau‐Ponty also calls perceptual faith “openness upon being.” (VI 88) But openness entails not only access but occlusion: access to world exists side by side with occultation (inaccess): “…these two possibilities, which the perceptual faith keeps side by side within itself, do not nullify one another.” (VI 28) We have already of course visited this notion of a side by side “contradiction” in which the sides nevertheless do not nullify each other—Merleau‐Ponty has called this “complementarity,” after the same notion in quantum mechanics (with whose lessons he continues to be preoccupied). Thus “complementarity” and “paradox” 















                                                390 Crisis 174 391 Aristotle, Complete Works of Aristotle. Tr. Jonathan Barnes. Princeton University Press, 1971. (pp. 1572‐1584) 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deleterious result of being “unphilosophical” in the required sense. When proper procedures are taken, “In such a case there cannot be any unclear, problematic concepts or any paradoxes.”392 (Ideas II, 428, my emphasis)  All of this becomes pertinent in the Crisis when Husserl confronts his own philosophy and its apparent paradoxes, those which critics had on seemingly good grounds pointed out. In this text, the paradox Husserl pays the greatest attention to is termed memorably by him the “paradox of subjectivity.” How is it, the paradox goes, that the entire world is constituted by only one part of the world, namely the part that consists of human subjects—that is, “real” human beings, the “community” of monads as they are elsewhere described? Of course, very much the same paradox was on Husserl’s mind even in Ideas I:  “Thus, on the one hand consciousness is said to be absolute in which everything transcendent and, therefore, ultimately the whole psychophysical world, becomes constituted; and, on the other hand, consciousness is said to be a subordinate real event within that world. How can these statements be reconciled?” (Ideas I 124)   The “solution” to the paradox (a “paradox which can be sensibly resolved”—Crisis 180) takes a familiar form in the Crisis. Husserl merely reaffirms the distinction he has by now made long ago and many times since, namely between empirical‐real human subjects, each of whom also transcendentally co‐constitutes the world (along with other human subjects), and the transcendental subjectivity/intersubjectivity for whom individual, particular egos are merely “phenomena,” ego‐poles of noematic‐noematic a priori correlativity of constitution.  





























                                                399 Compare: 45 reflection: “[as] reflection, re‐turn, re‐conquest, or re‐covery, it cannot flatter itself that it would simply coincide with a constitutive principle already at work in the spectacle of the world…” 400 Compare to Merleau‐Ponty’s description of philosophy as concerning the “far‐off as far‐off.” (VI 102) 401 Seebohm mentions that there are hints of “paradox” and “contradiction” in Merleau‐Ponty’s methodology, but claims (I think correctly) that it has more to do with the “what” than the “how.” See: Seebohm, Thomas M. “The Phenomenological Movement: A Tradition without Method? Merleau‐Ponty and Husserl.” In Merleau­Ponty’s Reading of Husserl. Eds. Ted Toadvine and Lester Embree. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002 (p. 66) 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Note that even here Merleau‐Ponty does not strictly speaking oppose either the eidetic or phenomenological reductions; he simply wants to push further and deeper, in an effort to be truly true to the “things themselves” and their paradoxical (because accomplished through difference) unity with us. As Langer points out helpfully, Merleau‐Ponty’s later procedure of thinking the origin, using reflection to go beyond it, is radically paradoxical only in a way that matches our own (i.e., humanity’s own) paradoxical being‐in‐the‐world in the first place.402 (Langer 165‐6) Indeed, once again, as we have come to expect, Merleau‐Ponty finds the reversal of the Husserlian impulse in Husserl’s own phenomenological imperative: “In recognizing that every reflection is eidetic and, as such, leaves untouched the problem of our unreflected being and that of the world, Husserl simply agrees to take up the problem which the reflective attitude ordinarily avoids—the discordance between its initial situation and its ends.” (VI 46) Even in an earlier essay, Merleau‐Ponty makes a similar point, saying, with what Merleau‐Ponty interprets as the mature Husserl: “We must, rather, become aware of this paradox—that we never free ourselves from the particular except by taking over a situation that is all at once, and inseparably, both limitation and access to the universal.”403    “Hyper‐reflection” becomes another name of philosophy itself. It takes account of dimensions of faciticity, spatiality and temporality, and ideality alike, sparing no dimension of existence in its ray of regard. (VI 46) Here is the “third dimension” where the antinomies of reflective analysis are, in a sense, lifted. But 












































                                                410 Merleau‐Ponty, Maurice. The Merleau­Ponty Reader. Lawlor, Leonard and Ted Toadvine, eds. Northwestern University Press, 2007 (p. 240) 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Areopagite.411 It also cannot be ignored that his metaphysics of “flesh” has a clear symbolic connection to the “flesh” of Christ, the man (visible) who, moreover, was/is God (invisible). Or again, there are the invocation of perceptual faith, the ultimate mystery of the world and being (PP xxiii), “pre‐established harmony,” grace and the “gift” of vision, and finally, to more indirect and esoteric references, such as the repeated use of “depth” to describe the absolute—a classically gnostic (Valentinian) description of the divine, according to Elaine Pagels.412  But I think that Gary Madison goes too far when he claims we can only appreciate Merleau‐Ponty in a Christian context.413 It is true that his attitude seems ultimately to be one of gratitude, humility, and wonder before Being. But this is also true of plenty of secular philosophers, not to mention mystics from other religions. Also, there is a way in which Madison’s claim might also be too weak, in addition to being too strong. For virtually any philosopher writing in the Christian West—even an atheist like Sartre—can be said to be indelibly marked by the dialectics of Christianity. By itself this illumines very little. There are certainly those besides the present author who have identified a distinct affinity between Merleau‐Pontian phenomenology and certain mystical schools; a case in point is New York University Hebrew Studies professor Elliot R. Wolfson, who uses Merleau‐Ponty’s thought to illumine the Kabbalah. Comments Wolfson in the “Prologue” to his monumental work Language, Eros, Being:  
                                                411 For example, the “miracle” of the many‐and‐the‐one—in reference to painting and biology. (N 154) The most relevant Pseudo‐Dionysian text is probably The Celestial Hierarchy. (General Books LLC, 2009) 412 Pagels, Elaine. The Gnostic Gospels. New York: Random House, 1979 (p. 32) 413 Madison, Gary. The Phenomenology of Merleau­Ponty: The Search for the Limits of Consciousness. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981 (p. 222‐5) 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“I shall labor…more on the pathways of Merleau‐Ponty’s thinking, as in his thought I find an affinity with the understanding I have derived from the study of kabbalistic literature and consequently feel it is legitimate to use his jargon to formulate hermeneutical and phenomenological suppositions in reading these sources.”414   In another place he notes, “Sensible beings, or what we perceive to be such, are [for Merleau‐Ponty] ‘radiations of verbal essences’—a notion that resonates with a central imaginal modality of Jewish esotericism…” (xxiii) Wolfson astutely observes, moreover, that for Merleau‐Ponty’s ontological phenomenology, as for Jewish mysticism, there is a central dialectic of revealing and concealing, which in the latter stems from the essential nature of the “effably ineffable” godhead, Ein Sof, and in the former expresses itself in terms of the attempt of philosophy to grasp the paradox of perceptual faith/the lifeworld:   “In the reconquest of the lifeworld, we thus discern a mutuality of ostensibly conflicting impulses: the urge to uncover, on the one hand, and the discovery that every uncovering is a covering over, on the other. As it happens, in English, the word ‘recover’ uncovers the paradox, for it means both ‘to expose’ and ‘to conceal.’”415 (xxiii)   The question of Merleau‐Ponty and his “methodological mysticism” has much to do with a question of attitude and affect. Merleau‐Ponty is as enthralled by a kind of numinosity of nature, the hidden‐and‐revealed source of being and the miracles of creativity and totality, just as surely as the Sufi mystic is fixated on the majesty and mystery of the one ineffable God. There is in Merleau‐Ponty a wonder at the 




                                                416 Toadvine, Ted. “Phenomenology and Hyper‐Reflection.” In Merleau­Ponty: Key Concepts. Eds. Rosalyn Diprose and Jack Reynolds. Stocksfield: Acumen, 2008 (pp. 28‐9) 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For Merleau‐Ponty, philosophy is not a matter of “solving” a problem, but of understanding the problem as its own truth. (This is different, of course, than understanding truth as a problem, perhaps a more characteristic posture for radical “postmodernism” than the “perceptually pious” Merleau‐Ponty.) When Merleau‐Ponty states a problem, it is stated very much as something to be further deepened, to be explored (the “absolute is depth”), etc. Towards addressing an issue in biology, for example, he says approvingly, as if hungering to learn from the lesson of another discipline: “Let’s say first that the expressions employed by the new school of biology are not solutions: the notions of field and gradient are the index of a problem, not responses.” (N 151, my emphasis) Contrary to Behnke, I don’t believe Merleau‐Ponty abandoned “description” for “explanation”417; on the contrary, he shows why a proper description, attentive to the paradoxical nuances of the truth made available to us, makes (ultimate) explanations moot. Explanation is the goal, one might say, of reflection; hyper‐reflection, by contrast, comes back to description by way of self‐description or a radical, uncompromising embrace of the finitude of reflection itself.  It also may seem that Merleau‐Ponty is more radical and subversive than Husserl (for example, by “throwing out” the universalistic or trans‐historical pretensions of philosophy once and for all), but this, as we have seen, can be turned around. Husserl’s intentions are, in the end, revolutionary and “subversive” in a way that Merleau‐Ponty’s are not. For Husserl seeks a “radical reshaping of our whole 













                                                418 More precisely: “True philosophy consists in relearning to look at the world.” (PP xxiii) 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Conclusion 
  We have now reached the end of our investigations. In this concluding section I will offer some wider reflections on both some of the systematic philosophical lessons to be learned from the Husserl‐Merleau‐Ponty encounter.   
I. Merleau­Ponty vis­à­vis Husserl In this dissertation we have seen how Husserl and Merleau‐Ponty understand and apply the phenomenological method and how they interpret its results. In particular, we have seen how Merleau‐Ponty reconsiders and modifies the basic Husserlian program—while somehow, I have argued, remaining true to fundamental aspects of it. He remains “true” to Husserl at least in the sense of embracing the Husserlian centralization of living consciousness and the phenomenological reduction that brings this consciousness and its world‐relation to active awareness (reflection).  Although we did not examine Husserl’s so‐called “later period” in much detail, we did review Ideas II, which, through the notions of the “personalistic attitude” and the Umwelt, already contains much of the core of the life‐world philosophy that was to later emerge. Throughout his writings Husserl displays an ambivalence, as Merleau‐Ponty points out, regarding the natural attitude in particular: is it left behind, somehow, in the transcendental reduction, or is it merely illumined therein? Do we come through the reduction to know ourselves as “natural” consciousnesses more fully, or do we realize ourselves as self‐split 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between higher and lower levels, the latter of which is subsumed in the more comprehensive (because intersubjective and oriented towards the universal) former? I have argued that we would be remiss to understand Husserl as an entirely consistent thinker with a predetermined agenda; on the other hand, one cannot ignore his persistently rationalistic orientation and preference, if you will, for the realm of “ideas.”  It is too easy, however, to assign Merleau‐Ponty the labels of “anti‐essentialist,” “anti‐rationalist,” etc. Rather, Merleau‐Ponty sees the same thing, as it were, that Husserl does; he knows the world to be a phenomenal field or milieu, not an impermeable Object separable from its manners of “givenness,” and he knows consciousness to be intertwined with the world through its body and its intuitive grasp of the world’s (inexactly) eidetic structure. But Merleau‐Ponty also, critically, sees the matrix of being‐and‐consciousness (or, simply, “Being,” the ontological “totality”) to be, in a certain sense, ineffable. As a whole, Being cannot be properly thought—a Kantian point from the latter’s “Transcendental Dialectic”—but neither does “reason” have “autonomy” such that it may tame the forms of experience into an idealistic template of determinacy. And the “whole” is not a regulative idea, such that a divorce between theory and practice becomes the only way to accommodate it. Rather, thought is part of the whole, it is part of “nature,” even if it is that part that has the meaning of what is a­part and “contrary” to nature—a contrariness endemic to nature itself.  This kind of territory obviously lends itself to comparisons with Hegelian dialectic, with which it is not unrelated even for Merleau‐Ponty. Hegel, famously, 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understands the spirit to know itself through its identification with a “higher form” of nature, namely the cultural world and the domains of art, religion, and philosophy. As I read him, Merleau‐Ponty, by contrast, understands what Hegel means by “self‐knowing spirit” to be itself a form of alienation from its own nature, though at the same time a necessary one that holds nature and spirit alike in a tension that stems from an originary “unity of opposites,” which can no longer be thought except paradoxically, and which leaves its legacy of lasting ambiguity in the human experience.  Thus for Merleau‐Ponty, Nature is neither the object of thought nor a subject, nor even their coincidence in a higher synthesis, but rather the paradoxical “depth” (“the absolute”) and “otherness” (which is nonetheless paradoxically inclusive) of the human spirit. By itself this is not a Husserlian view, but it is the culmination of a systematic meditation Merleau‐Ponty refers to from very early on as the “phenomenology of phenomenology”—a reaching of the limits of what is thinkable in subjective or constitutional terms, limits which reveal the dependence of spirit on a pre‐reflective nature which is also, at the same time, precisely not amenable to theoreticization along the lines of a scientific “naturalism.” In this way, Merleau‐Ponty’s philosophy preserves the sense of consciousness revealed in the “transcendental” attitude and through the transcendental epoché and reduction, but without going so far as to allowing thought to “take possession of the world.” The transcendental attitude becomes subsumed in the paradox of nature—in a wholeness or totality, that is, which can only be thought as an “unthinkable.” 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All of this exposes a signficant fault line between Husserl and Merleau‐Ponty. For Husserl seems to broadly accept the scientific‐physicalistic definition of nature, adding only that its sense as “physical nature” is derived from transcendental subjectivity. But this will not do for Merleau‐Ponty. Nature cannot be limited to such a sense, because it cannot be fully grasped in the first place. As the condition for the possibility of consciousness, it is necessarily beyond it. At the same time, the transcendental attitude—taken to the extreme of hyper‐reflection, which then problematizes the scope of the transcendental attitude itself—is able to understand this “beyond” as the hidden depths of its own self, the “soil of subjectivity.” Due to this intertwining between the two—this is Merleau‐Ponty’s “speculative” move, if you will—subject and nature (note: not “object”) are not simply mutually alienated “substances,” but rather members of an identity relation that is nevertheless, at its core, self‐splitting (dehiscence, the paradox of the “other,” etc.). Comparisons to what Heidegger comes to call “sameness without difference” or “belonging‐together” are probably apt here.  It is clear that Merleau‐Ponty is in a kind of struggle only or primarily with the “transcendental idealist” Husserl of the middle period (and of the later period, to the extent that this “Husserl” remains). We can only properly assess Merleau‐Ponty’s philosophy once we accept the premise of there being certain “self‐contradictions” within Husserl’s thought itself. Phenomenology becomes in Merleau‐Ponty’s hands a meditation on the paradoxes of human existence and incarnation left bare by Husserl’s analysis. Colloquially speaking, one might say in this sense that Merleau‐Ponty “pitches his tent” in Husserl’s “backyard.” 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Thus this dissertation is about a critique, but it is a strangely “internal” one. Merleau‐Ponty operates within a framework largely (though not wholly) defined by phenomenology. He should be seen, I think, as someone who quietly but decisively 
reforms phenomenology and brings it into a sphere of interactive relevance with the sciences and with other realms of culture—history, politics, art, religion—by softening the dichotomies that Husserl rigidly puts into place.   
II. Merleau­Ponty and Some Other Philosophers For Merleau‐Ponty, philosophy—as phenomenology—is an exercise in dialectics. Not positive or negative dialectics, so to speak, but the dialectics of self‐meditation. Like Montaigne, Merleau‐Ponty finds an infinity in himself. He is fascinated by “experience” and its open‐endedness. He finds this same wondrousness in Husserl’s writings, but he also identifies rationalist, Cartesian presuppositions there that dictate a certain result. In contrast, Merleau‐Ponty’s dialectic is not a movement “towards” anything. Experience neither begins nor ends in thought, but outside of it. Thus philosophy is a matter simply of overcoming its need, as it were, to overcome experience—it is a matter of finding its home not in itself (this is the Hegelian solution, the “satisfaction” of consciousness) but in the quest for itself, which necessarily does not end in itself (as a consciousness).  This is not Kant: for while Kant, too, places a limit on reason, he limits experience itself to an artificially controlled domain, a discursive fiction. In Merleau‐Ponty, humanity is plunged into a sea of unknowing, so to speak, on the raft of 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perceptual faith. There are no epistemic guarantees, not even of a “transcendental” kind.   Merleau‐Ponty’s embrace of the Heideggerian “being‐in‐the‐world” in the “Preface” of the Phenomenology of Perception is well‐known, but Merleau‐Ponty’s conception of nature and spirit departs from Heidegger’s in a significant way. For whereas Heidegger privileges “Being” over “beings,” suggesting a radical break between them that is constantly covered over by “metaphysics,” Merleau‐Ponty does not understand “Being” to be anything other than the interplay of nature and spirit, or exteriority and interiority, in a carnal field he famously terms the “flesh,” and which he also identifies with “nature” in an expanded, holistic sense. In this way, Merleau‐Ponty is closer to Hegel, but again with a critical difference. For Merleau‐Ponty rejects the idea that nature (and hence the self, since we are “of” nature) can be fully known, since it is necessarily unknown to itself. In this regard Merleau‐Ponty calls on Schelling’s notion of the Abgrund or “abyss within God” that is the “savage principle” of nature. Merleau‐Ponty is less interested in the theological or moral implications of this than the epistemological and ontological ones: nature is a “wild being” that cannot be known by spirit even though spirit is of it.  In this way, Merleau‐Ponty becomes interested in the Freudian concept of an “unconscious,” in that he saw a structural parallel between nature (or the body) as the “unconscious” of spirit and the internal structure of the psyche, an interplay of conscious and unconscious dimensions. 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III. The “Personalistic Attitude” and the Limits of Reflection We have spent a good deal of time examining Merleau‐Ponty’s reformulation of phenomenology in terms of the interplay of perception, reflection, and what I have called a third and new type of attitude, “hyper‐reflection.” Hyper‐reflection is a kind of “meta‐attitude,” an attitude in which the natural and reflective attitudes take their respective positions. Husserl’s recognition of the untenability of the sharpness of the natural/ transcendental divide is reflected in his notion of the “personalistic attitude.” Of course, here, the “natural attitude” comes perilously close to merging with the “transcendental”; some of Husserl’s descriptions of “spirit” smack of a similar or identical “absolutism” and “ontological privilege.” Merleau‐Ponty is fundamentally right to identify a central tension in Husserl’s philosophy between an understanding of the “natural attitude” as one that is opposed and superseded in the phenomenological reduction, on the one hand, and a “natural attitude” that is sub‐divided, in itself, between lower and higher poles (as I have mentioned above). But Husserl’s “poles”—the naturalistic and the personalistic—are not what Merleau‐Ponty would have in mind. After all, the “naturalistic” attitude is not truly natural at all. It is precisely unnatural, the purely theoretical lens of the scientist. Unlike the transcendental or phenomenological or reflective stand‐point, it does not seek to understand the world as existentially known, much less to understand the natural 
attitude itself. It does not thematize natural experience or being, it simply restricts the field of experience to a certain set of eidē that frame the results of experiments performed in the world. Another way to put it is that there is no true, separable 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“scientific attitude.” This is what Merleau‐Ponty means when he suggests in the 
Nature lectures that science (by which he refers to scientific praxis and not theory) is continuous simply with “experience.” Clearly, it is the “personalistic attitude” that is the truer, deeper form of the everyday natural life of living subjects—of human subjects, though of course even animals possess Umwelten.  But we saw that with his description of it, Husserl makes of the personalistic attitude a kind of basis for a subjective idealism. How can Merleau‐Ponty avoid this result? He can do so precisely by limiting the scope of reflection, by assigning reflectivity or the “thinking attitude” to an eidetic matrix, itself historically conditioned, an attitude which at its outer limits of reflexivity opens up into an interrogation into its origins. Nature, as the ultimate source of meaning and being (as opposed to “transcendental subjectivity,” either individual or intersubjective), is not coincident with the ego cogito. It appears in various guises as the hidden “other” that is also the hidden “self,” the unknowable depth that is simultaneously inescapably transcendent, and other such paradoxes that result from the attempt of reflection to think the unthinkable. It is known through acts of creativity, through the pulse of life and willed motion, and through the principle of “totality” which eludes ratiocinative analysis and yet must be understood as being at the basis of the significance of language, behavior, art, politics, and even sexuality.   
IV. Phenomenology as Paradox With bodily subjectivity, Merleau‐Ponty supplements the first paradox of phenomenology, that of “immanent transcendency” (or, the principle of the world’s 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having to be within us just in order to be without us) with its flip‐side, namely the principle that for there to be a “within” at all, this “within” must first be “without,” spread out in the world, so to speak.  Of course both formulations are incomplete and even, technically, misleadingly dualistic in their own right. But this is why Merleau‐Ponty’s later reflections concentrate precisely on the mystery of the unsayability of this union—which, as Heraclitus had maintained of all contraries, is “one” because of difference rather than in spite of it—and its relation to thought, which must contradict itself, finally, to recreate a sense of the unity, so to speak, “after the fact.”     
V. Naturalism Merleau‐Ponty, unlike Husserl or Kant, does not oppose a timeless realm (or sphere of consciousness) to a temporal one. So there is also a move in him towards naturalization and immanentism, though not in the “naturalistic” sense of those who would circumscribe consciousness within an unconscious “reality.” Merleau‐Ponty’s “naturalism” defies both realist and idealist interpretations of the term. Merleau‐Ponty’s naturalism is phenomenological; he cannot be safely appropriated by modern “cognitive scientists” and the like. This is a question of starting‐point; modern naturalism starts later than it thinks it does. It obscures the origin by theorizing it, indeed by privileging theory over experience. For what does experience tell us about a “nature” or “world” that has no share in the “mind” or “soul,” which is after all doing the experiencing? 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Husserl and Merleau‐Ponty, while having very different approaches, are both respectful of the complexity facing any theory of nature in which human subjectivity is taken seriously as non‐reducible to scientific‐naturalistic causality, while at the same time involved in the thick of perceptual experience (as opposed to being directed to an ethereal Platonic realm of Ideas). Husserl, however, believed that the way to overcome scientific naturalism was to swallow it whole, as it were, in the gulp of transcendental subjectivity. Merleau‐Ponty’s approach is rather to question both naturalism and transcendental philosophy at once as victims of false absolutization and avoidance of the fundamental paradoxes of human existence. 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